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This study examines the reliability and validity of the Evacuation Decision Support Tool 
(EDST). The EDST is designed to provide healthcare facilities, emergency managers, and other 
agencies with a systematic process with which to evaluate and guide “evacuation” versus 
“shelter in place” decision making for a variety of “all hazards” situations. The EDST is 
comprised of 7 items that assess “threat” and 9 items that measure “consequences” of a 
situation. The tool was designed to provide users with a decision on whether to remain, 
prepare, or evacuate from a healthcare facility. To date, there has not been a study that 
examined psychometric properties of any evacuation decision tool, including the EDST.   
A total of 83 raters from 18 facilities (hospitals, nursing homes, and adult care centers) 
in New York State were recruited to participate in a controlled study. Three standardized 
scenarios (power failure, ice storm, and hurricane) were developed across five standardized 
situations (communications failure, critical supply shortage, electrical utility power failure, 
external flood, and internal flood). Preferred scores were determined for each situation by a 
panel of subject matter experts, essentially creating a “gold standard” against which the raters’ 
scores could be judged and validated.  
Main findings from this study are as follows: 
 The overall scale reliability was 0.93, indicating a high level of internal consistency 
across the items. Reliabilities for the threat and consequence items were 0.83 and 
0.91, respectively. This suggests that the scoring of items within each of the scales were 
highly consistent across different raters. 




 The EDST was found to measure two distinct constructs, threat and consequence of a 
situation. As hypothesized, results supported the factorial validity (internal structure) of 
the tool to be composed of two factors. Measures of model fit used to provide evidence 
for factorial validity were consistent with standards used in the literature.    
 Rater reliability based on agreement between raters and expert judgment was 72% for 
raters and 76% for team-based scores, using combined measures of exact and 
adjacent agreement. However, exact agreement was 28% for rater scores and 30% for 
team-based scores. 
 Discussion with team members led to about 50% of rater scores being changed, with 
12% of the changed scores deviating by 2 or more points.  
 Work experience was significantly associated with more accurate ratings. Raters with 
more work experience at current facility, but fewer years at current position had greater 
odds of exact or adjacent agreement with expert judgments.  
 The accuracy of evacuation decisions generated by EDST compared to expert 
judgment was less than 40%. This may indicate a mismatch between the evacuation 
decision reported by the tool and the perceived decision of the rater.  
 
In summary, these findings suggest that the EDST provides consistent measures of threat and 
consequence across different raters. However, there remain questions regarding the accuracy 
of the scores and decisions generated by the tool. These preliminary results indicate a 
promising use of the EDST for planning and evaluation purposes, but may require continued 
refinements to increase accuracy of decisions.  




Assessing the Reliability and Validity of the Evacuation 




Unlike observations that can be scored objectively (e.g., number of doctors or patients), 
rating processes often require raters to quantify subjective phenomena that may not have clear 
answers (McClellan, 2010; National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, 1993; Margolis 
& Ross, 1995). This can become a problem, because raters may vary in perception and prior 
knowledge of the material being evaluated. Yet, as with any rating procedure, the scores given 
by raters must be comparable, both over time and over different conditions; in other words, 
scores must be consistent and trustworthy, regardless of when or who scores the instrument.  
The difficulty associated with rating tasks raises concerns about its possible benefits. 
However, according to Livingston (2009), there are complex competencies, direct 
performances, or explication of reasoning that cannot be fully measured when only objective 
measures are used.  The judgment to evacuate, prepare, or remain in a healthcare facility (HCF) 
during a disaster is an example of a decision that may benefit from the use of raters.  Although 
several models have been developed to assist HCF administrators with this decision, there has 
not been a comprehensive study that has examined various characteristics of these tools – in 
light of this need in the field, this study investigates the psychometric properties of the 
Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST; Incident Management Solutions, 2009), an instrument 
that bases decisions on the evacuation of a healthcare facility using measures of threat and 
consequence. The EDST is designed to provide HCF, emergency managers, and other agencies 




with a systematic process to evaluate and guide “evacuation” versus “shelter in place” decision 
making for a variety of “all hazards” situations.  
This study examines the reliability and validity of the EDST in light of the following:  
 Reliability of the items (scale) to generate consistent scores,  
 Factors underlying internal structure (factorial validity) of the EDST,  
 Rater reliability and agreement,  
 Characteristics of raters that affect accuracy, and  
 Classification accuracy of evacuation decisions. 
This report presents findings of a controlled study using standardized scenarios developed 
by content experts that describe the use of the EDST for evaluation and planning of evacuation 
decisions. Implications and future directions for research using an evacuation decision tool such 
as the EDST are also discussed.  
II. Literature Review 
 
Review of evacuation in healthcare facilities  
 
There have not been many studies that have examined measurement characteristics of 
instruments used for evacuation in HCF. In fact, most studies focus on contextual aspects such 
as the cause, methods, and useful guidelines for evacuation. Despite lack of studies on this 
topic, this section provides an outline of previous studies that have examined evacuation – the 
review of these studies will indicate the significance of this current study to evaluate the 
reliability and validity of a tool that can guide and support evacuation planning decisions, as it 
fills a critical gap in the literature.  




Although evacuation in HCF is often believed to be caused by natural disasters, they 
have mostly been identified as having been caused by hazards originating within the hospital or 
from “human intruders” (Sternberg, Lee, & Huard, 2004). With regards to methods used in 
evacuation, the study by Schultz, Koenig, and Lewis (2003) describe the results of two types of 
hospitals during an earthquake, where one evacuated their most critically ill patients first as 
they required the most resources and placed a greater burden on hospital staff; the other 
hospitals decided to move the healthiest patients first, a strategy that permitted the evacuation 
of large numbers of patients in the shortest amount of time. This study showed that the latter 
strategy was more efficient as concerns for speediness of evacuation of resources were less of a 
constraint.  
Factors affecting hospital evacuation have also been examined through the use of 
simulation models (Taaffee, Kohl, & Kimbler, 2005; Taaffe, Johnson, & Steinamann, 2006). They 
have shown that effective use of simulation models can help assess plans for evacuation, 
determine plan sensitivities, develop risk probabilities, and prepare for physical exercise. It can 
also be used to create customization across hospital facilities based on hospital locations, 
patient mix, susceptibility to threats and other factors; it also allows local hospitals the ability to 
monitor an evacuation currently in progress. Simulation models have found that the number of 
patients and the mode of transportation were important factors contributing to the duration of 
evacuation. 
In 2010, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services released two guides for use in hospital evacuations. In the first 
report by Zane, Biddinger, Gerteis, and Hassol (2010), a framework was developed to assist in 




the initial evaluation of a hospital upon return after an evacuation/closure due to an emergency 
event, which has sustained significant or widespread damage. Factors outlined for 
consideration were type of event, decisions supporting the implementation of the evacuation 
plan, non-structural reasons for the evacuation, environmental issues that may have affected 
the decision to evacuate, occupants of the hospital after shut down, and the length of time of 
closure. The second report by Zane, Biddinger, Hassol, Rich, Gerber, and DeAngelis (2010) 
provided guidance for hospital evacuation decision teams with organized and systematic 
methods on how to assess factors that affect the decision to order an evacuation and assist 
decision teams in identifying special situations. The framework outlined in this guide has the 
most relevance to this study. The guide included a pre-disaster self-assessment and discussion 
of both pre-and post-event evacuation decision making. It also presented decisions that affect 
the sequence of patient evacuation (e.g., evacuating medically fragile patients or mobile 
patients first).  
Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST) 
 
The EDST is designed to facilitate the emergency planner for possible evacuation of the 
HCF and is applicable in a variety of “all hazards” situations: communications failure, critical 
supply shortage, electrical utility power failure, fire (external), fire (internal), flood (external), 
flood (internal), fuel shortage (oil), generator failure, hazmat incident affecting facility, HVAC 
failure, loss of community infrastructure, loss of external support, medical gas failure, natural 
gas failure, physical plant damage, sewer failure, smoke or fumes (internal), staffing 
insufficiency, steam failure, and water supply failure. The EDST is designed to provide HCF, 




emergency managers, and other agencies with a systematic process to evaluate and guide 
planning of “evacuation” versus “shelter in place” decision making.  
The algorithm used to determine the evacuation decision is based on a combination of 
EDST items that measure threat and consequence factors of a particular situation. The threat 
factor consists of 7 items that question the types and severity of challenges: severity, duration, 
cascade potential, evacuation difficulty, shelter-in-place (SIP) capability, destination capability, 
and recovery time. In the original scoring guide, EDST threat items are scored in a scale of 0 
(low) to 1 (high) in intervals of 0.2. The consequence factor inquires the consequences and their 
severity and comprises of 9 items: life safety, security, staffing, physical plant, utilities, 
communications, resources and assets, patient clinical and support activities, and external 
logistics. It is scored between 0 (low impact) to 9.5 (high impact). For this current study, both 
threat and consequence items were scored on a 1 to 6 scale to reduce possible bias that raters 
may perceive in the different scoring intervals used in the original scale.  
The EDST decision to evacuate the healthcare facility is based on a two-step process. 
First, individual raters independently score the EDST. Following this process, raters in a HCF 
convene and review their individual results to develop a consensus score.  When there is 
disagreement, the group discusses to resolve the issue and achieve consensus. The calculation 
of the evacuation decision score is based on the product of the sum scores within each factor; 
that is, a sum score for both threat and consequence factors are calculated and subsequently 
multiplied to produce a scale score on a range of 1 to 600. The EDST scoring guide provides the 
following interpretations for the scores: 
 Scores less than 200: Remain at the facility (shelter in place) 




 Scores between 200 and 399: Prepare for evacuation 
 Scores above 400: Evacuate the facility 
Studies on rater effects 
 
There are two main difficulties associated with consistency in a rating process: (1) 
different raters assign different scores to a particular condition and (2) the same rater may 
assign different scores to the same response on different occasions (Coffman, 1971). In a classic 
study by Diederich, French, and Carlton (1961), where 300 essays were judged by 53 raters, it 
was found that 94% of the essays received at least 7 different scores from the raters. As 
exemplified in this study, there are a wide variety of errors, or rater effects, associated with 
rater scoring (Myford and Wolfe, 2003). Rudner (1992) classifies measurement errors 
associated with raters as follows: 
(1) Halo effect: impressions that a rater forms about a condition,  
(2) Stereotyping: impressions that a rater forms about a group of conditions,  
(3) Perceptional differences: viewpoints and past experiences of a rater that can affect 
interpretation of behaviors or context,  
(4) Leniency or stringency error: systematically scoring higher or lower  because of 
insufficient knowledge to make an objective rating, and  
(5) Scale shrinking: occurs when raters do not consistently or similarly use the ends of 
any scale.  
To improve consistency and to reduce rating errors, the literature recommends that 
raters familiarize themselves with the measures they are using, understand the sequence of 
operation, and explain how they interpreted the data. There are many empirical studies that 




have shown the effectiveness of these strategies. For example, in Latham, Wexley, and Purcell 
(1975), employment interviewers were trained to reduce rater effects and in Pulakos (1986), 
training focused on the type, interpretation, and usage of data led to greater inter-rater 
reliability. Furthermore, in Shohamy, Gordon, and Kraemer (1992), it was found that the overall 
reliability coefficients were higher for trained raters than untrained raters, whereas the 
background of the raters did not affect their reliability. As these studies show, rater training can 
be used to alleviate rater differences.  
Studies have also documented the limitations of rater training, because they cannot 
completely reduce rater bias. For example, studies have shown that training was only effective 
among novice raters (Weigle, 1998) and that its sole use could not fully eliminate differences in 
raters’ behaviors (Hoskens & Wilson, 2001; Engelhard, 1992; Lumley & McNamara, 1995). In 
fact, raters are reluctant to change their customary scoring habits – training them to ignore the 
appearance and the context has not been successful over time (Hughes et al., 1983; Powers et 
al., 1994; Rafoth & Rubin, 1984; Sweedler-Brown, 1992).  
The findings from these studies reiterate that rater differences are difficult to overcome 
even with sufficient training. This may indicate that the level of reliability assumed in the 
instrument may not be attained even with training. As such, examining rater characteristics 
following effective training provides an indication of how reliable the instrument as whole 
function. In addition, items scored by raters and their interaction are of value as they together 
determine the soundness of the instrument used (DeCarlo, Kim, & Johnson, 2011). 
 
 






This study examines the reliability and validity of the EDST, with respect to the following 
psychometric characteristics of the tool: 
 Reliability of the items (scale) to generate consistent scores,  
 Factors underlying internal structure (factorial validity) of the EDST,  
 Rater reliability and agreement,  
 Characteristics of raters that affect accuracy, and  
 Classification accuracy of evacuation decisions. 
This section describes the study design and analyses used to investigate these properties of the 
EDST.  
Data and study design 
 
Scenarios and situations. To study the EDST, standardized scenarios with pre-identified 
situations were developed. We define scenario as disasters such as flood, fire, hurricane that 
may require the use of the EDST instrument for evacuation; the magnitude of the situation is 
not accompanied in this definition. Three scenarios were developed: (1) power failure, (2) ice 
storm, and (3) hurricane. In addition, five situations were developed within scenarios. We 
define situation as the particular case within a scenario. The situations developed are as 
follows: (1) critical supply shortage, (2) communications failure, (3) electrical utility power 
failure, (4) external flood, and (5) internal flood. To apply the EDST for a situation within 
scenario standardized domain-specific facility models were developed. These standardized 
facilities were developed to provide raters with a model with which to apply the EDST, such that 




all participants were using the same EDST framework; otherwise, raters could possibly apply the 
EDST to their own facility. All standardized scenario, situation, and domain-specific facilities 
were developed by a panel of subject matter experts through discussion and careful review of 
materials. 
Table 1 shows the allocation of situations by scenarios. Actual description of the 
standardized scenarios and situations are attached to this document (see Appendix). For each 
scenario and situation, scores reflecting expert judgments for items in the EDST were 
predetermined. These are “preferred scores” (henceforth true scores), which essentially 
represent “gold standard” again which the raters’ scores could be judged and validated. The 
process of developing true scores to compare rater scores is commonly practiced in evaluating 
scores for performance-based assessments.  
Originally, the EDST scores threat items on a 0 to 1 scale with intervals of 0.2 (i.e., 0, 0.2, 
0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0). Consequence items are scored on a 0 to 9.5 scale with intervals of 2.5 
(i.e., 0, 1.5, 3.5, 5.5, 7.5, and 9.5). However, to standardize the scoring and to reduce possible 
rater bias, a 1 to 6 scale was used for this current study in both threat and consequence items. 
Table 1 shows the true scores using the original EDST scoring convention.  
























Power Failure Critical Supply Shortage 114 Shelter 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 
Power Failure Communications Failure   83 Shelter 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.4 
2 
Power Failure Critical Supply Shortage 225 Prepare 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Power Failure Communications Failure 338 Prepare 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 
3 
Ice Storm Electrical Utility Power Failure 205 Prepare 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Ice Storm Critical Supply Shortage 166 Shelter 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 
4 
Ice Storm Critical Supply Shortage 190 Shelter 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 
Ice Storm Electrical Utility Power Failure 322 Prepare 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
5 
Hurricane Flood, External 311 Prepare 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Hurricane Flood, Internal 267 Prepare 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 
6 
Hurricane Flood, External 200 Prepare 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 


















Power Failure Critical Supply Shortage 1.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.5 7.5 
Power Failure Communications Failure 3.5 0.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 
2 
Power Failure Critical Supply Shortage 1.5 5.5 5.5 7.5 7.5 3.5 5.5 9.5 7.5 
Power Failure Communications Failure 5.5 3.5 7.5 5.5 9.5 9.5 7.5 9.5 9.5 
3 
Ice Storm Electrical Utility Power Failure 5.5 1.5 1.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 5.5 
Ice Storm Critical Supply Shortage 1.5 0.0 3.5 5.5 1.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 7.5 
4 
Ice Storm Critical Supply Shortage 1.5 1.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 5.5 7.5 
Ice Storm Electrical Utility Power Failure 7.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 7.5 5.5 5.5 7.5 7.5 
5 
Hurricane Flood, External 7.5 5.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 3.5 5.5 7.5 5.5 
Hurricane Flood, Internal 7.5 5.5 3.5 7.5 7.5 3.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 
6 
Hurricane Flood, External 3.5 3.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 7.5 5.5 
Hurricane Flood, Internal 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 
Note: Values indicate expert judgments (true scores) for items in the EDST with respect to scenarios and situations. Originally, threat items are scored 
on a 0 to 1 scale with intervals of 0.2 (i.e., 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0); consequence items are scored on a 0 to 9.5 scale with intervals of 2.5 (i.e., 0.0, 
1.5, 3.5, 5.5, 7.5, and 9.5). This study recoded these categories into a 1 to 6 scale. The EDST score was calculated by taking the product of the sums for 
each factor. 




The development of the standardized cases considered comparability of situations assigned to 
facilities. Discussion and consensus with field experts were used to increase the fidelity of the 
cases.  
Recruitment of raters. A total of 18 facilities were recruited for this study across 3 
domains of facilities: (1) hospital, (2) nursing home, and (3) adult care. There was a balance in 
the number of facility domains (6 from each facility domains). 83 raters participated from the 
facilities. From adult care, there were 26 raters; from hospitals, there were 27 raters; and from 
nursing homes, there were 30 raters. Table 2 presents the distribution of facility domain and 
number of raters by facility name. 
Table 2. Facility domain and number of raters by facility name 
Facility Name  
(18 total) 
Facility Domain 
(6 from each) 
Raters per site 
(83 total raters) 
Babylon Beach House Adult Care 2 
Beach Terrace Care Center Nursing Home 5 
Coney Island Hospital Hospital 7 
Elizabeth Church Manor Nursing Home Nursing Home 4 
Good Samaritan Hospital Medical Center Hospital 4 
Good Shepherd Fairview Home Nursing Home 5 
Horace Nye Home Nursing Home 5 
Keene Valley Neighborhood House Adult Care 4 
Kingsway Manor, LLC Adult Care 6 
New Haven Manor Adult Care 4 
NYU Hospitals Center Hospital 6 
Our Lady of Consolation Nursing Home 5 
Our Lady of Lourdes Memorial Hospital Hospital 5 
Rockaway Manor HFA Adult Care 4 
San Simeon By the Sound Center Nursing Home 6 
St. Mary's Healthcare Hospital 3 
The Hearth at Castle Gardens Adult Care 6 
United Health Services Hospitals Hospital 2 
Note: A total of 83 raters were recruited across 18 sites. There was a balance in the number of adult 
care, hospitals, and nursing homes (6 from each facility domain). Between facility domains, 26, 27, and 
30 raters participated from adult care, hospital, and nursing homes, respectively.  




Specifications for the study design. To allow for maximum balance of scenarios and 
situations, the following specification was designed (see Table 3). Each column represents 
situations (top header) and scenario (bottom header) combination. Details of each scenario and 
situation with respect to expert judgment scores are indicated in Table 1. For each facility, 2 
different scenarios were assigned, with a total of 4 situations per facility. All raters within the 
same facility were assigned to score the same scenario and situation. The combination of 
scenario and situation assignment specified in Table 3 presents a balance of different conditions 
used in this study that also considered feasibility in distributing the case materials to the 
facilities. For example, for Babylon Beach House, communications failure and critical supply 
shortage situations were assigned from the power failure scenario; in addition, electrical utility 
power and critical supply shortage were assigned from the ice storm scenario. 
 Study procedure. Participants in the study were given access to the EDST scoring 
spreadsheet prior to the study session with instructions on the scoring guide. Scores in the EDST 
tool were generalized to be on a 1 to 6 scale for both threat and consequence factors. This was 
conducted to minimize any bias that raters may exhibit toward a particular item. During 
training, raters spent a day reviewing the overview of the study and were given detailed 
definitions of each score category and the differences in definition between each score category 
(e.g., “3” versus “4”). Each situation, scenario, and standardized facility was reviewed by a 
moderated conference call. Participating raters were emphasized to discriminate differences in 
each category by fully understanding details associated with the scoring guide of the EDST.  




 On the day of study, each facility received the scenario and situation description. Raters 
scored the EDST spreadsheet individually. Following individual scoring, the facility convened to 
generate team-based scores through discussion and consensus. 




Table 3. Allocation of facility to scenarios and situations  
Facility 
















Babylon Beach House X X X X     
Beach Terrace Care Center X X 
  
X X 
Coney Island Hospital X X X X 
  Elizabeth Church Manor  X X X X 
  Good Samaritan Hospital  X X X X 
  Good Shepherd Fairview Home X X X X 
  Horace Nye Home X X 
  
X X 
Keene Valley Neighborhood House X X X X 
  Kingsway Manor X X 
  
X X 
NYU Hospitals Center X X X X 
  New Haven Manor X X 
  
X X 
Our Lady of Lourdes Memorial  X X 
  
X X 
Our Lady of Consolation X X 
  
X X 
Rockaway Manor HFA X X 
  
X X 
San Simeon By the Sound Center X X X X 
  St. Mary's Healthcare X X 
  
X X 
The Hearth at Castle Gardens X X X X 
  United Health Services Hospitals  X  X X X     
 
Note: Each column represents situations (top header) and scenario (bottom header). For each facility, 2 different scenarios are 
assigned, with a total of 4 situations per facility. For example, for Babylon Beach House, communications failure and critical supply 
shortage situations were assigned from the power failure scenario; in addition, electrical utility power and critical supply shortage 
were assigned from the ice storm scenario.  
 
 




Raters were not permitted to change their individual scores.  This process was repeated for each 
scenario. For both individual and team-based scores, perceived evacuation decisions (remain, 
prepare, or evacuate) were collected through a post-study survey. Characteristics of the 
participants that included their demographic information and work-related information were 
also collected in the post-study survey.  
Analysis 
 
Cronbach’s alpha (Lord & Novick, 1968) was used to assess the scale reliability (i.e., 
internal consistency of scores in the EDST items). However, this does not provide evidence for 
factorial validity, which examines the underlying internal structure of the EDST (i.e., domains 
measured by the tool). The EDST is hypothesized to have two underlying factors – threat and 
consequence. To examine the factorial validity of EDST, fit statistics (e.g., Root Mean Squared 
Error of Approximation, 2  statistic, Information-Criteria measures, Tucker-Lewis index, 
Comparative Fit Index) from confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used. A model comparison 
between a unidimensional structure (single factor across all EDST items) and the two-factor 
structure (threat and consequence) was tested.  
Rater reliability was assessed using measures of agreement between rater or team-
based scores and expert judgments (true scores). Among the most commonly used measures 
for calculating inter-rater agreement are the exact, exact plus adjacent, and discrepant 
agreement statistics (Ricker-Pedley, 2011). These measures have gained popularity in assessing 
the accuracy of rating tasks that are ordinal in nature due to their simplicity in interpretation; 
agreement statistics are commonly used for operational purposes to examine rater agreement 
in high-stakes decisions. Exact agreement refers to exact match in scores between raters; exact 




plus adjacent agreement is the proportion of scores that are one point above or below the 
score of another rater; discrepant agreement is the ratio of scores that differ by two or more 
points. These measures can be calculated based on scores given by multiple raters or between 
raters and an expert judgment (true score) given by a master or content expert. However, a 
limitation to this approach is the lack of consideration for agreement that can occur by chance. 
For example, in a rating task scored on a 1 to 6 scale, the probability of exact agreement by 
chance between two raters is 16.7%. Given that agreement can result from chance, researchers 
have also used Cohen’s kappa as another measure for inter-rater agreement (Cohen, 1960); this 
statistic penalizes agreement that can occur by chance. A modified version of the kappa statistic 
that takes into account tendency for raters to score in the “middle” categories is the weighted 
kappa, where linear or quadratic weights are applied depending on the context and spacing 
between categories (Cohen, 1968; Shaeffer, Briel, & Fowles, 2001); the weighted kappa is 
equivalent to the intraclass correlation commonly used to assess rater agreement (Fleiss & 
Cohen, 1973). Differences between rater scores and team-based scores were also examined 
using measures of rater agreement.  
To assess how rater characteristics (i.e., job level, years at current position, years at 
current facility, employment status, and facility type) may be related to the accuracy of scores, 
logistic regression was used. Finally, perceived evacuation decisions indicated by raters and the 
facilities were compared with expert judgments on evacuation decision to examine 
classification accuracy – how well perceived evacuation decisions matched with decisions 
provided by the EDST. Scores from the EDST based on original scoring algorithm (product of 
sum scores across threat and consequence factors) were also compared to perceived 




evacuation decisions. Cross tabulations were created to present the proportion of accurate 
classification matches between the evacuation decisions.  
IV. Results 
 
Demographic characteristics of participants  
 
Table 4 shows the demographic characteristics of the raters that participated in this 
study. More than 50% of the raters were over 50 years of age; they were mostly White. Slightly 
more females (54%) participated than males (46%). Nearly 60% of participants had at least a 
four-year college degree. 
Table 4. Demographic characteristics of raters 
Characteristic n % 
Age 
Less than 40 years 15 23.44% 
40 to 50 years 15 23.44% 
Over 50 years 34 53.13% 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 70 89.74% 
Other   8 10.26% 
Gender 
Female 42 53.85% 
Male 36 46.15% 
Education 
Less than 4 year college 25 40.32% 
4 year college 23 37.10% 
Advanced degree 14 22.57% 
Note: Demographic characteristics were collected in a post-study survey. Some raters did not 
report their demographic background.  
 
 
In addition to these background characteristics, Table 5 shows the distribution of work-related 
factors. More than half of the raters were senior-level. Work experience was measured using 
two questions: years at current position and years at current facility. In both measures of 
experience, more than 50% of the participants had less than 10 years of work experience.   




Scale reliability and factorial validity 
 
Reliability of the items to generate consistent scores: Scale reliability. Consistency in 
scores across different raters is an important characteristic of a psychometrically reliable tool. 
Scale reliability refers to the consistency in the same score (or decision) that can result from 
multiple uses of a tool. Reliability is traditionally measured using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 
1951). Accordingly to Nunnally (1978), a reliability coefficient above 0.70 can be viewed as an 
acceptable reliability estimate for an instrument.  
The overall scale reliability of the EDST was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha; the overall 
scale reliability was 0.93. Reliabilities for treat and consequence items were 0.83 and 0.91, 
respectively. These results indicate that the scoring of items within each of the scales were 
highly consistent across different raters.  
Table 5. Work-related characteristics of raters 
Characteristic n % 
Job level 
Entry-level   6   7.59% 
Mid-level 31 39.24% 
Senior-level 42 53.17% 
Years at current 
position 
≤ 5 years 31 39.24% 
6 to 10 years 14 17.73% 
11 to 20 years 16 20.26% 
20+ years 18 22.79% 
Years at current  
facility 
≤ 5 years 26 32.92% 
6-10 years 15 18.99% 
11-20 year 21 26.59% 
20+ years 17 21.52% 
Employment Status 
Full-time 76 96.20% 
Part-time   3   3.80% 
Facility type 
Hospital 25 31.65% 
Nursing Home 27 34.18% 
Adult care facility 27 34.18% 
Note: Work-related information was collected in a post-study survey. Some raters did not report this 
information.  




Factors underlying the internal structure of EDST: Factorial validity. This section 
examines whether the EDST measures two distinct factors as hypothesized. Without examining 
the underlying internal structure, it will be unclear whether there are multiple distinct factors 
and whether these factors share sufficient common variance (i.e., “hanging well together”). The 
underlying structure of the EDST was examined using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The 
use of CFA allows a test of whether the two hypothesized factors – threat and consequence – 
are distinct and have sufficient information to be measured as unique factors.  
Table 6 presents the model comparison results between a single-factor model, assuming 
one underlying factor measured by the EDST, and a two-factor model, using the two 
hypothesized factors of threat and consequence. The one-factor model results indicates the fit 
indices when only a single construct is assumed in the EDST; the two-factor model assumes 
threat and consequence factors to be the underlying structure of the EDST. When model fit 
indices are better for a specific model, it implies that the data support the better fitting model, 
which provides a test for factorial validity.   
Table 6. Model comparison results 
Statistic One-factor model Two-factor model 
χ2 (df) 512.83 (104) 366.02 (103) 
RMSEA (95% CI) 0.10 (0.09, 0.11)  0.08 (0.07, 0.09) 
Akaike information criteria (AIC) 15258.62 15113.80 
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) 15450.45 15309.63 
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.88 0.92 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.86 0.91 
Note: One-factor model assumes unidimensional structure; two-factor model assumes two 
underlying factors, threat and consequence, as hypothesized by EDST design. RMSEA: Root 
mean squared error of approximation.  
 




Results indicated that the two-factor model fit significantly better than the one-factor 
model. Using criteria recommended in Hu and Bentler (1999), the two-factor model was 
consistent with standards used in the literature, with RMSEA less than 0.08 and CFI/TLI above 
0.90. The AIC and BIC indices were also lower for the two-factor model, which indicated that 
the model fit better. The χ2 test was significant for both models, with p<0.05; however, given 
adequate fit indices from all other measures, these results can be used to support a two-factor 
structure in the EDST. As such, these results indicate that the underlying internal structure of 
the EDST supports the hypothesized factors of threat and consequences.  
The CFA also generates factor loadings, which indicates the strength of each item to the 
specified factor. Table 7 shows the factor loading results. Factor loadings range between 0 to 1 
and can be interpreted as correlations between the items and the factor; higher values in factor 
loadings indicates greater strength in the item. In the threat factor, cascade potential and 
shelter-in-place (SIP) capability have the highest factor loadings. In the consequence factor, 
utilities, resources and assets, and patient clinical and suport have the highest factor loadings. 
Figure 1 illustrates the factor structure of the EDST to provide a visualization of the tool’s 
internal structure. Arrows pointing to items (in rectangle boxes) indicate factor loadings. The 
figure also shows the correlation between the two factors of 0.84. Factor loadings can be used 
as weights that can be assigned for caculating the score for the factor to create weigthed threat 












Threat factor Consequence factor 
Severity 0.49 (0.04) 0.51 (0.04)     
Duration 0.60 (0.03) 0.68 (0.03) 
  Cascade Potential 0.68 (0.03) 0.73 (0.03) 
  Evacuation Difficulty 0.57 (0.04) 0.63 (0.03) 
  SIP Capability 0.69 (0.03) 0.78 (0.02) 
  Destination Capability 0.45 (0.04) 0.51 (0.04) 
  Recovery Time 0.68 (0.03) 0.73 (0.03) 
  Life Safety 0.73 (0.03) 
  
0.72 (0.03) 
Security 0.66 (0.03) 
  
0.66 (0.03) 
Staffing 0.75 (0.02) 
  
0.76 (0.02) 
Physical Plant 0.67 (0.03) 
  
0.68 (0.03) 
Utilities 0.79 (0.02) 
  
0.80 (0.02) 
Communications 0.62 (0.03) 
  
0.63 (0.03) 
Resources and Assets 0.79 (0.02) 
  
0.80 (0.02) 
Pt. Clinical & Support 0.79 (0.02) 
  
0.82 (0.02) 
External Logistics 0.75 (0.02)   0.77 (0.02) 
Note: Values in parenthesis represent standard errors.  







Note: Values pointing to EDST items indicate factor loadings, correlation between item to the respective factor. The correlation between the two 
factors was estimated to be 0.84.  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of factor loadings for the two-factor model EDST




Rater reliability and agreement 
 
 Rater reliability and agreement. To assess rater reliability, rater scores and team-based 
scores were compared with expert judgment (true scores) as indicated in Table 1; scores in 
Table 1 were converted to 1 to 6 scale. Table 8 shows the rater agreement measures across the 
16 EDST items by rater and team. Exact agreement refers to the proportion of one-to-one 
match between rater and team-based scores to expert judgment scores; adjacent agreement 
indicates agreement for one point above or below expert judgment. Discrepant indicates 
proportion of two or more point difference in scores. Combined indicates sum of exact and 
adjacent agreement.  Kappa is a measure of agreement that takes into account agreement that 
can occur by chance; weighted kappa takes into account the ordinal nature of the six score 
categories in EDST.  
 Overall, exact agreement across the EDST items for the raters was 28%; for the team-
based scores, it was 30%. Combined exact and adjacent agreement was 72% and 76% for raters 
and team-based scores, respectively. Furthermore, threat factor had higher agreement than 
the consequence factor by about 10%. For the threat factor, the exact and adjacent agreement 
was 78% and 82% for raters and team-based scores, respectively; for the consequence factor, 
the exact and adjacent agreement was 68% and 72%, respectively.  
Characteristics of raters that affect accuracy. Table 9 shows a cross tabulation of work-
related factors that relate to greater agreement. Results indicate that more years at current 
position had lower agreement with expert judgment. Table 10 confirms this result in a logistic 
regression where all work-related factors were simultaneously analyzed. In addition to years at 
current position (less years) indicating greater odds of agreement, raters with more years at 




current facility had a significantly greater odds of agreeing with expert judgments. An 
interaction term was added between years at current position and facility, which had a 
significant estimate. To aid interpretation of the interaction term, Table 11 was added, which 























Table 8. Rater reliability: Rater and team scores with expert judgment 
Item Status Exact Adjacent Combined Discrepant Kappa Wgt. Kappa 
Severity 
Rater 0.32 0.47 0.79 0.21 0.05 (0.03) 0.22 (0.05) 
Team 0.42 0.32 0.74 0.26 0.15 (0.07) 0.16 (0.10) 
Duration 
Rater 0.39 0.43 0.82 0.18 0.12 (0.04) 0.22 (0.06) 
Team 0.47 0.36 0.83 0.17 0.24 (0.09) 0.22 (0.13) 
Cascade Potential 
Rater 0.29 0.45 0.74 0.26 0.02 (0.03) 0.24 (0.05) 
Team 0.29 0.45 0.75 0.25 0.01 (0.07) 0.26 (0.11) 
Evacuation 
Difficulty 
Rater 0.29 0.48 0.77 0.23 0.02 (0.03) 0.15 (0.05) 
Team 0.38 0.50 0.88 0.12 0.09 (0.08) 0.19 (0.11) 
SIP Capability 
Rater 0.31 0.48 0.79 0.21 0.02 (0.03) 0.22 (0.05) 
Team 0.28 0.54 0.82 0.18 –0.02 (0.06) 0.24 (0.11) 
Destination 
Capability 
Rater 0.37 0.46 0.83 0.17 –0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) 
Team 0.43 0.45 0.88 0.12 0.02 (0.08) 0.04 (0.10) 
Recovery Time 
Rater 0.30 0.46 0.76 0.24 0.05 (0.03) 0.19 (0.04) 
Team 0.25 0.61 0.86 0.14 –0.04 (0.07) 0.29 (0.10) 
Life Safety 
Rater 0.17 0.36 0.53 0.47 0.00 (0.02) 0.07 (0.03) 
Team 0.22 0.38 0.61 0.39 0.03 (0.05) 0.08 (0.07) 
Security 
Rater 0.18 0.34 0.52 0.48 –0.02 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03) 
Team 0.13 0.43 0.57 0.43 –0.10 (0.05) 0.16 (0.08) 
Staffing 
Rater 0.24 0.48 0.72 0.28 0.02 (0.03) 0.17 (0.04) 
Team 0.21 0.55 0.76 0.24 –0.02 (0.06) 0.11 (0.09) 
Physical Plant 
Rater 0.28 0.46 0.75 0.25 0.04 (0.03) 0.13 (0.04) 
Team 0.37 0.47 0.84 0.16 0.14 (0.07) 0.26 (0.10) 
Utilities 
Rater 0.25 0.43 0.68 0.32 0.04 (0.03) 0.18 (0.05) 
Team 0.29 0.41 0.70 0.30 0.08 (0.06) 0.12 (0.11) 
Communications 
Rater 0.23 0.42 0.65 0.35 0.08 (0.02) 0.15 (0.04) 
Team 0.20 0.46 0.66 0.34 0.02 (0.04) 0.15 (0.10) 
Resources and 
Assets 
Rater 0.25 0.53 0.79 0.21 0.01 (0.03) 0.23 (0.04) 
Team 0.26 0.61 0.87 0.13 0.00 (0.06) 0.24 (0.09) 
Pt. Clinical & 
Support 
Rater 0.26 0.46 0.73 0.27 0.04 (0.03) 0.19 (0.05) 
Team 0.29 0.43 0.72 0.28 0.05 (0.06) 0.16 (0.12) 
External Logistics 
Rater 0.28 0.45 0.73 0.27 –0.04 (0.03) 0.15 (0.05) 
Team 0.28 0.45 0.73 0.27 –0.03 (0.07) 0.18 (0.12) 
Overall 
Rater 0.28 0.45 0.72 0.28 0.03 (0.03) 0.16 (0.04) 
Team 0.30 0.46 0.76 0.24 0.04 (0.07) 0.18 (0.10) 
 
Note: Exact agreement is the proportion of one-to-one match between rater and team scores 
with expert judgment; adjacent agreement indicates agreement for one point above or below 
the expert judgment. Discrepant indicates proportion of two or more point difference in scores. 
Combined indicates sum of exact and adjacent agreement.  Kappa is a measure of agreement 
that takes into account agreement that can occur by chance; weighted kappa takes into 
account the ordinal nature of the score categories (1 to 6 scale) in EDST.   
 
 




Table 9. Factors affecting agreement with expert judgment: Cross tabulation 
Characteristic Exact and adjacent agreement Discrepant 
Job Level 
Entry 71.77% 28.23% 
Mid 71.65% 28.35% 
Senior 73.58% 26.42% 
Years at current 
position** 
≤ 5 years 72.62% 27.38% 
6-10 years 76.80% 23.20% 
11-20 year 71.99% 28.01% 
20+ years 70.13% 29.87% 
Years at current 
facility 
≤ 5 years 71.55% 28.45% 
6-10 years 74.63% 25.37% 
11-20 year 70.84% 29.16% 
20+ years 74.88% 25.12% 
Employment 
Status*** 
Full Time 73.19% 26.81% 
Part-time 59.79% 40.21% 
Facility Type 
Hospital 70.76% 29.24% 
Nursing 74.35% 25.65% 
Adult 72.80% 27.20% 
Note: Exact agreement is the proportion of one-to-one match between rater and team scores 
with expert judgment; adjacent agreement indicates agreement for one point above or below 
the expert judgment. Discrepant indicates proportion of two or more point difference in scores.        
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Values represent row percents. 
 
 
Table 10. Factors affecting agreement with expert judgment: Logistic regression 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% CI 
Mid-level 0.99 (0.13) (0.76, 1.28)  
Senior-level 1.03 (0.15) (0.78,  1.36)  
Entry-level (reference)       
Years at current position*** 0.72 (0.05) (0.62,  0.82)  
Years at current facility 0.92 (0.07) (0.80,  1.07)  
Years at current position x facility** 1.09 (0.03) (1.03,    1.14) 
Full time*** 1.96 (0.32) (1.41,  2.71) 
Part-time (reference)       
Nursing 1.03 (0.10) (0.86,  1.24)  
Adult 1.02 (0.09) (0.86,  1.21)  
Hospital (reference)       
Note: Values in parenthesis represent standard errors. Odds ratio represent likelihood in 
greater exact or adjacent agreement with expert judgment. An intreraction term was added for 
year at current position with years at current facility. ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 




Table 11 shows that as years at current facility increased, the odds of greater accuracy 
varied for different years at current position. In fact, when years at current position was less 
than 5 years or greater than 20 years, more work experience at current facility increased the 
odds of accurate ratings; however, when years at current position was between 6 to 20 years, 
the odds ratios varied. This indicates that work experience should be examined at both levels of 
current position and current facility. 
 
Table 11. Predicted odds ratios (adjusted) between years at current position and facility 
 
Years at current 
position 
Years at current facility 
≤ 5 years 6-10 years 11-20 year 20+ years 
≤ 5 years 2.83 3.04 3.07 NA 
6-10 years NA 2.54 2.83 2.39 
11-20 year 1.75 2.16 2.56 2.99 
20+ years 1.44 1.85 2.36 3.07 
Note: Values marked “NA” do not have raters for the particular combination. The table of 
predicted odds ratios presents the postestimation results based on Table 10.  
 
Full-time status was also associated with greater agreement; however, there were only a small 
number of part-time workers (less than 4%). 
Comparison between rater scores and team-based scores 
 
 Characteristics of raters that affect team-based scores. During the study, each rater 
individually scored the assigned situation described for the particular scenario. Following the 
individual scoring phase, raters gathered to generate team-based scores through discussion. 
Each facility subsequently generated a single team-based score for each situation assigned. 
Table 12 shows the agreement between rater scores and team-based scores (interpretation of 
the agreement statitics is the same as Table 8). Results indicate that on average, 50% of rater 
scores were unchanged; among the remaining 50% that were changed, 38% of rater scores had 




adjacent agreement with team-based scores (1 point change), while only 12% of the scores had 
discrepancies of two or more points in the 1 to 6 scale. Between the threat and consequence 
factors, the combined agreement was 87% and 89%, respectively.   
Table 12. Comparison of rater and team-based scores 
Item Exact Adjacent Combined Discrepant Kappa Wgt. Kappa 
Severity 0.49 0.32 0.81 0.19 0.31 (0.03) 0.27 (0.06) 
Duration 0.57 0.34 0.91 0.09 0.32 (0.04) 0.36 (0.06) 
Cascade Potential 0.45 0.40 0.84 0.16 0.22 (0.03) 0.34 (0.06) 
Evacuation Difficulty 0.43 0.44 0.88 0.13 0.19 (0.03) 0.42 (0.05) 
SIP Capability 0.43 0.48 0.91 0.09 0.19 (0.03) 0.45 (0.06) 
Destination Capability 0.50 0.35 0.85 0.15 0.22 (0.03) 0.35 (0.05) 
Recovery Time 0.53 0.36 0.89 0.11 0.34 (0.03) 0.55 (0.05) 
Life Safety 0.49 0.35 0.85 0.15 0.28 (0.03) 0.45 (0.05) 
Security 0.45 0.41 0.86 0.14 0.26 (0.03) 0.52 (0.05) 
Staffing 0.49 0.41 0.90 0.10 0.26 (0.03) 0.55 (0.05) 
Physical Plant 0.53 0.35 0.88 0.12 0.35 (0.03) 0.51 (0.05) 
Utilities 0.56 0.35 0.91 0.09 0.34 (0.03) 0.50 (0.05) 
Communications 0.45 0.39 0.85 0.15 0.21 (0.03) 0.32 (0.05) 
Resources and Assets 0.55 0.38 0.93 0.07 0.30 (0.03) 0.57 (0.05) 
Pt. Clinical & Support 0.52 0.39 0.91 0.09 0.31 (0.03) 0.53 (0.05) 
External Logistics 0.57 0.35 0.92 0.08 0.37 (0.03) 0.58 (0.06) 
Total 0.50 0.38 0.88 0.12 0.28  (0.03) 0.45  (0.06) 
Note: Exact agreement is the proportion of one-to-one match between rater and team scores 
with expert judgment; adjacent agreement indicates agreement for one point above or below 
the expert judgment. Discrepant indicates proportion of two or more point difference in scores. 
Combined indicates sum of exact and adjacent agreement.  Kappa is a measure of agreement 
that takes into account agreement that can occur by chance; weighted kappa takes into 
account the ordinal nature of the score categories (1 to 6 scale) in EDST.   
 
Table 13 indicates factors that are associated with team-based scores. This information 
can provide insight into individuals that lead the discussion process in generating team-based 
scores. Results indicate that entry- and senior-level raters have greater agreement than mid-
level raters. This is also reflected in years at current position, where raters with 6 to 10 years of 
experience have the lowest exact and adjacent agreement. In Table 14, a logistic regression was 




used to examine the influence of these factors together. Results reiterate findings in Table 13. 
Mid- and senior-level raters had a significantly lower odds of exact and adjancent agreement 
than entry-level rater. Similar to findings in Table 10, full-time status was also linked with lower 
agreement; however, given low sample sizes in part-time status raters, this result will not be 
given full meaning. Finally, although insignificant, more experience at current position was 
marginally associated with greater agreement with tream-based scores. The inclusion of an 
interaction term for work experience was not significant; as such, this is not represented in the 
final results shown in Table 14.  
Table 13. Factors affecting agreement with team-based scores: Cross tabulation 
Characteristic Exact and adjacent agreement Discrepant 
Job Level*** 
Entry 93.92%   6.08% 
Mid 84.12% 15.88% 
Senior 90.00% 10.00% 
Years at current 
position** 
≤ 5 years 88.88% 11.12% 
6-10 years 84.44% 15.56% 
11-20 year 87.27% 12.73% 
20+ years 89.67% 10.33% 
Years at current facility 
≤ 5 years 88.41% 11.59% 
6-10 years 87.16% 12.84% 
11-20 year 87.81% 12.19% 
20+ years 88.07% 11.93% 
Employment Status* 
Full Time 87.72% 12.28% 
Part-time 93.65% 6.35% 
Facility Type 
Hospital 87.35% 12.65% 
Nursing 88.76% 11.24% 
Adult 87.69% 12.31% 









Table 14. Factors affecting agreement with team-based scores: Logistic regression 
Exact and adjacent agreement Odds Ratio 95% CI 
Mid-level*** 0.35 (0.08) (0.22,  0.55)  
Senior-level* 0.60 (0.15) (0.38,  0.97) 
Entry-level (reference)       
Years at current position 1.10 (0.06) (0.99,  1.22)  
Years at current facility 0.93 (0.05) (0.83,  1.03)  
Full time** 0.40 (0.13) (0.22,  0.74)  
Part-time (reference)       
Nursing 1.09 (0.14) (0.85,  1.41)  
Adult 0.99 (0.12) (0.79,  1.25)  
Hospital (reference)       
Note: Values in parenthesis represent standard errors. Odds ratio represent likelihood in 
greater exact or adjacent agreement with expert judgment. Interaction term between years at 
current position and current facility not added to the table, as it was insigificant. * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
Classification accuracy of evacuation decision 
 
 The final result examines the comparison between a global decision (remain, prepare, 
evacuate) and the decision EDST scores suggest. This evaculation of classification accuracy is 
critical as decisions from the tool is expected to predict an external critera. To assess the 
classification accuracy of evacuation decisions, three measures were used: (1) self-reported 
perceived evacuation decision by raters and teams, (2) predetermined evacuation decision by 
content experts, and (3) EDST score decisions based on rater and team-based scores (using 
cutoff criteria of EDST scores < 200 for remain, 200 to 400 for prepare, and above 400 for 
evacuate). Table 15 shows the cross tabulation of these results for both raters and teams. A 
greater classification accuracy represents a closer match between an external criteria and the 
decision inferred by the tool.  




The first cross tabulation in Table 15 shows the classification between rater perceived 
decision with EDST score decision. Classification accuracy (agreement in the decision) was 38% 
for raters and 31% for teams. In the the second cross tabulation, the classification between 
expert predetermined decision (true score) and EDST score decision are presented. The 
classificaiton acuracy was 54% for both raters and teams. Finally, in the third cross tabulation, 
expert predetermined decision was compared with raters’ perceived decision. Classification 
accuracy was 37% for raters and 38% for teams. Values with correct classification are 
highlighted.  
These results indicate that correct classification with raters’ perceived decision was less 
than 40%. The classification accuracy of experts’ predetermined decisions mapped with EDST 
score decisions (based on raters’ scores) was less than 55%, indicating possible misclassification 
between decisions. Overall, depending on the external criteria used, classification accuracy 
ranged between 37% to 54%. 
Figure 2 illustrates the range of EDST scores by raters’ perceived decisions (X-axis) and 
EDST scores (Y-axis). This figure was generated to indicate ranges of EDST scores for which 
raters perceived to yield decisions to remain, prepare, and evacuate. Since there are two expert 
judgments pertaining to remain and prepare, two figures were restricted to situtions that 
indicate these decisions. Although the figure does not provide definitive ranges of EDST scores 
that indicate evacuation decisions, the 95% confidence interval ranges do illustrate some 
association between perceived decisions with EDST scores.  







 The use of an evacuation decision instrument to guide decisions during an emergency or 
disaster should provide greater assistance for preparing facilities and individuals. It should also 
provide support in providing policymakers with additional evidence when such an instrument is 
known to be reliable and valid. However, to date, there has not been a study that has examined 
such psychometric characteristics of a tool. With respect to such demand, this study fills the 
gap in the literature as well as provide the necessary foundation for administrators and 
policymakers in the field.  
 This study examined the reliability and validity of the EDST, an instrument that provides 
a systematic process for evaluating and planning whether a facility can remain, prepare, or 
evacaute from a disaster. In particular, this study investigated the scale reliability (consistency 
in scores), factorial validity (factors underlying the internal structure of the tool), rater reliability 
(agreement), characteristics of raters that affect accuracy, and classification accuracy of 
decisions reported by the tool. Results indicate that scale reliability of the instrument was 
excellent with high internal consistency. This means that scoinrg of items witin each of the 
scales were highly consistent across different raters – a critical foundation required in a reliable 
tool. 




Table 15. Classification of perceived evacuation decision with predetermined and EDST score decision 
 
Rater perceived decision \ EDST score decision 
Rater (%) Team (%) 
Remain Prepare Evacuate Total Remain Prepare Evacuate Total 
Remain 12.00 22.67 4.00 38.67 3.64 9.09 0.00 12.73 
Prepare 9.00 22.33 2.00 33.33 23.64 20.00 0.00 43.64 
Evacuate 5.67 18.33 4.00 28.00 9.09 27.27 7.27 43.64 
Total 26.67 63.33 10.00 100.00 36.37 56.36 7.27 100.00 




Expert predetermined decision \ EDST score decision 
Rater (%) Team (%) 
Remain Prepare Evacuate Total Remain Prepare Evacuate Total 
Remain 16.47 25.88 3.82 46.18 21.05 23.68 1.32 46.05 
Prepare 10.29 37.06 6.47 53.82 14.47 32.89 6.58 53.95 
Total 26.76 62.94 10.29 100.00 35.53 56.58 7.89 100.00 




Expert predetermined decision \ Rater perceived 
decision 
Rater (%) Team (%) 
Remain Prepare Evacuate Total Remain Prepare Evacuate Total 
Remain 18.33 14.33 14.33 47.00 7.27 12.73 25.45 45.45 
Prepare 20.33 19.00 13.67 53.00 5.45 30.91 18.18 54.55 
Total 38.67 33.33 28.00 100.00 12.73 43.64 43.64 100.00 
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In addition, as hypothesized, two factors were found to describe the underlying 
structure of the EDST – threat and consequence factors. These results should be promising 
evidence that the fundamental aspects of the tool are sound. Results from the confirmatory 
factor analysis also indicated different factor loadings between items of EDST to their 
respective factors, which suggests possible differential weighting algorithm of the items for 
calculating the EDST score. 
 Measures of rater reliability indicated further research may be required to increase 
agreement and scoring accuracy. Currently, exact agreement was less than 30% and combined 
exact and adjacent agreement was about 75%.  In addition, it appeared that team-based scores 
did not significantly improve the accuracy of scores; they only improve agreement marginally 
(by about 4%). Further emphasis or research can be conducted to refine agreement by 
increasing methods for training or developing scenarios that may better assess these findings. 
Finally, classificaion accuracy of evacuation decision requires continued attention. Results from 
this study indicates classification accuracy with perceived decision to be less than 40%. 
Prediction of accuracte evacuation decision is the ultimate outcome of this tool and may 
require additional attention for refinement in score calculation and derivation of meaningful 
cutpoints. These results suggest that the EDST should be used as a planning tool to assist in 
guiding evacuation process as well as providing a sysmtatic framework for collecting relevant 
information in situations where evacuation or shelter in place is a possible course of action. 
The overall findings of this study indicate that the current framework used in EDST lead 
to consistent scores. However, the accuracy of scores and the associated decisions require 
further investigation in a continued study. There are several possibilities to consider in future 
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work, which could not be investigated in this current study. Four relevant considerations for 
future studies are suggested. First, assigning different weights to items in EDST seems to be a 
reasonable action based on variability of factor loadings from the CFA. In fact, the factor 
loadings can be used as a weight in deriving the EDST score. Currently, the tool assumes equal 
weight across the items. Second, the tool currently uses 6 disctinct ordinal categories for each 
item. However, it is unclear whether raters perceive 6 distinct categories, based on exact and 
adjacent agreement statistics. Training should reinforce raters to master the understanding of 
each category associated with the item. Raters should be able to discriminate differences 
between each category; for example, training can focus on differences between adjacent 
categories such as “3” and “4” which should allow raters to increase their awareness of the 
scores they assign. At the same time, when certain categories seem overlapping, collapsing 
them can be an alternative; when raters cannot discriminate certain categories, they could be 
collapsed. The specific methodology used for collapsing may need to be developed in future 
work. Third, the scoring algorithm used to calculate the overall EDST score requires refinement. 
Taking the sum of items within each factor and subsequently taking their product to derive the 
overall EDST score has not been validated in previous research; this report also finds that the 
current EDST score may not reflect the full information gathered in the 16 items of EDST. A 
careful study design that considers a composite score combining the two factors is required. 
Finally, setting appropriate cut points to the instrument is necessary; this process is known as 
standard settig in the educational and psychological literature. This is an extensive process that 
requires results from both empirical data and expert judgment from a representative panel. 
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Without setting meaningful cutpoints based on both data collection and expert judgment, it 
becomes difficult to validate the classification accuracy of evacuation decisions.   
 There are several limitations to this study. This includes the participants and facilities 
recruited, which cannot be generalized to raters that may face an actual disaster in a healthcare 
facility. In addition, standardized scenarios, situations, and facilities developed in this study may 
be specific to the particular content assessed. These limitations can be addressed in future 
studies that recruit a larger sample of participants and a greater variety of  scenarios. Likewise, 
demographic information of participants should be collected to continue investigating 
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Scenario I. Power Failure – Overview of Incident 
 
It is 5:30 am, Thursday August 16, 2012.  At about 4:00 am EST, a transformer handling power 
for a major trunk line exploded due to heat accumulation and high use associated with an on-
going heat wave striking the Northeast. The explosion caused the transformer to go off line 
resulting in a spotty regional power failure affecting some homes, health care facilities and 
businesses in Empire County (EC) and in the area of Empire County Nursing Home (ECNH). Due 
to the regional power failure, cell phone service is disrupted and land line circuits are over 
loaded.  ECNH is on emergency power, has activated its Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), 
contacted its office of emergency management, its NYSDOH RO and begun to contact its mutual 
aid partners. Per its EOP it is activating and staffing its primary EOC, contacting staff and 
developing an incident action plan to manage its response to the power outage.  
 ECNH has established baseline Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST) scores as part of 
pre incident planning in conjunction with its yearly hazard vulnerability assessment 
(HVA). The emergency management committee (EMC) has concerns about facility ability 
to maintain a safe environment of care for its residents with limited electric power as 
this is a type of incident that is not high on its HVA. It is considering two possible 
situations that may develop, shortage of critical supplies and communications failure.  
 To assist in its planning and response to the incident, the EMC has developed an 
overview of the impact of the incident on ECNH. The evaluation is based on the detailed 
inventories of key facility systems, utilities and resources, as well as its plans and 
procedures for resident care, staff support and anticipated community support during 
the incident. What follows is a summary of the evaluation as discussed by the EMC, 
including consideration of OEM and DOH situations reports and baseline bed availability 
data as of August 16, 2012.  
Critical Supply Shortage – Situation Warranting a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECNH has food, fluids, medication and linens for about 72 hours, including about 3.5 days (84 
hrs) of diesel fuel on site to power its emergency generator. It has instituted system wide 
conservation measures, to include fuel, food and other supplies. It expects to continue 
conservation measures throughout the outage, operating on a projected time frame of 8 - 24 
hours.  The EMC is concerned that ECNH will experience shortages of such resources as fuel and 
medical gases if the power outage lasts for more than three days. Due to the wide distribution 
of the incident, disruption of community based supply chain and large distribution of 
evacuation zone if needed, full restoration of services and depleted resources will take between 
8 - 24 hrs beyond the restoration of the usual power supply. ECNH has a plan and resources to 
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transport staff to the facility when usual transportation systems are not effective and 
anticipates that less than 10% of its staff will not be able to come to work during the next 
operational period.  Some non-essential services will be combined across shifts to minimize 
impact on resident services.  Per its EOP, staff support services (rest and sleeping, food, family 
support) will be provided as applicable.      
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
ECNH has run checks on all critical life safety, e.g., fire alarm and suppression systems, resident 
wandering systems, ventilator, oxygen and dialysis and associated back-up systems. All are 
connected to the emergency power system (EPS) and are operable. Little impact from future 
critical supply shortages is expected.  All safety and security systems and most but not all of the 
40 electronic locks in the facility are tied to emergency power. Those that are not will fail to the 
open position and require monitoring. The ECNH building is drafty, and some areas do receive 
excessive sun exposure. The AC and ventilation systems are on emergency generator and will 
continue per the availability of fuel with at worst only partial brown outs to non-essential 
zones. Two of the five elevators are on emergency power. This will slow down but not preclude 
vertical transit of residents and services. The facility is able to provide boiler generated steam, 
prepare hot and cold foods, pump water as needed and maintain refrigeration. Due to 
restrictions on number of utilities tied to emergency power, and procedures to conserve 
existing fuel, these functions will be slower than usual. The facility’s internal phone and 
intercom communications system are operational. External land line and cell phone services are 
very unreliable. It has tested its two way radios and is cycling all through recharge to ensure 
continued use.  
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support, External Supplies  
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. ECNH has some evacuation equipment, about 50% of the staff have been 
trained on its use. Limited evacuation equipment combined with possible restricted use of 
elevators may make evacuation more difficult, requiring about twice the time of its established 
planning assumptions, and physically demanding.  The EMC has learned that many of its mutual 
aid partners in contiguous counties have been impacted by the power failure and have 
expressed reluctance to even consider accepting evacuees should that become necessary. They 
have indicated that even though they have available beds, they too are concerned about 
staffing and resources shortages should the outage continue for several days. The EMC 
considers that that if evacuation becomes necessary, residents will need to be placed outside 
the community and face travel times of more than one hour each way, well in excess of its 
evacuation planning assumptions. The EMC has reviewed ECNHs evacuation and shelter in 
place plans with facilities management, dietary, nursing and human resources. The facility is 
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secure and has the resources and a stay team available and is operating on a minimum SIP time 
frame of three days. In spite of conservation measures, as supply of resources decreases during 
the incident, staff will have to spend more time and effort to distribute its on-site supplies to its 
residents as supplies will have to be moved from deeper in reserves for actual use. Some 
reduction of resident related services (hot food, social activities) and environmental services 
(AC) will be reduced to decrease fuel consumption. Further decreases in the type and timing of 
resident services cannot be ruled out at this time.  ECNH is a member of a local mutual aid plan. 
However, many of these facilities, local vendors and emergency management partners will be 
equally challenged by the power outage and may not be able to provide assistance in the form 
of medical and non-medical supplies.  If the outage becomes protracted, and/or its distribution 
widens over the next operational period, resource replenishment from external partners will be 
more much difficult and time consuming. 
 
Communications Failure – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECNH has various different interoperable communications methods including two way radios 
for internal and short range communications. These have been tested and found operational. 
The local public utility company and Office of Emergency Management have reported that it 
could be 2-3 days before power is restored and have suggested that health care facilities plan 
on system wide problems for at least this period of time.  The power outage is making it 
difficult to communicate with staff via cell phone as cell phone service is disrupted and land line 
circuits are over loaded. Once the EOC team is in place, ECNH begins to examine its in house 
staff and ability to contact off duty staff. It anticipates that up to 10% of its staff will not be able 
to come to work during the next operational period. This may worsen over successive 
operational periods as staff content with the power outage in their homes and with their 
families. It has instituted communications as possible with staff or volunteers to maintain safe 
operations. ECNH anticipates that all services can be maintained by existing staff and resources 
for at least 2-3 days and that communication limitations should be resolved between 8 - 24 
hours after the resumption of regular electrical power services.   
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
ECNH has reviewed all life safety and security systems. They are operational and connected to 
the emergency power system. It has adequate internal communications capabilities should any 
life safety or security issues arise and to communicate within the physical plant in the absence 
of external electric power. The power outage is making it difficult to communicate with external 
constituents via cell phone and may delay or impede ECNH's ability to contact utility and other 
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repair staff during the event.  ECNH  has various different IOC systems which have been tested 
and found operational, but communications is still slow. ECNH’s internal phone and intercom 
communications system is operational. However, external land line and cell phone services are 
very unreliable, no signal or dropped signal is already common, making communications more 
challenging and slow. ECNH does not have any priority (GETS, WPS, TSP) service agreements in 
place. ECNH does not have an 800 mhz or amateur radio in place. It has tested its two way 
radios and found they are operable. Facility management has placed them on chargers to 
ensure they remain operable.   
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support, External Supplies  
ECNH has begun to contact its local mutual aid partners and is learning that many other 
healthcare facilities both in and contiguous to EC are also experiencing either limited or total 
power and communication outages.  This communications issue might delay placement of 
residents if there is a need to evacuate, and evacuation time frames would run much longer 
than those used for plan assumptions.   ECNH is confident that the facility infrastructure is 
resilient and that if sufficient resources are available it can successfully and safely shelter in 
place. ECNH is currently successfully communicating with local emergency management and 
giving them situational awareness of their resource needs.  HERDS surveys normally used to 
assess the bed availability and appropriate care capabilities for ECNH residents do not have 
complete information on all facilities due to difficulty in communications.  With the information 
currently available it is suggested that only about 50% of ECNH residents can be placed locally 
and the remainder would need to travel at least 90 minutes to be placed.   ECNH has multiple 
IOC systems, including two way radios for internal and short range external communication; 
however, service is slow and unreliable and is causing delays and some failed communications. 
Due to the general power failure, access to electronic medical records is unavailable and the 
facility would need to rely on paper patient files; though communications are slow and difficult, 
the resources on hand and should last through to the expected restoration time. ECNH has 
multiple IOC systems, including two way radios for internal and short range external 
communications to whom it may reach out for external supplies should the power outage 
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Scenario II: Power Outage – Overview of Incident 
 
Real time, 5:30 am, Saturday August 18, 2012.  At about 4:00 am EST, a transformer handling 
power for a major trunk line exploded due to heat accumulation and high use associated with 
the recent and on-going heat wave striking the Northeast. The explosion caused the 
transformer to go off line resulting in a widespread regional power failure affecting many 
homes, health care facilities and businesses in Empire and surrounding counties, and in the 
area of EC Nursing Home. Due to the power failure, cell phone service is limited and land line 
circuits are in-operable. ECNH is on emergency power, has activated its Emergency Operations 
Plan (EOP), contacted its office of emergency management, its NYSDOH RO and begun to 
contact its mutual aide partners. Per its EOP it is activating and staffing its primary EOC, 
contacting staff and developing an incident action plan to manage its response to the power 
outage.  
 ECNH has established baseline Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST) scores as part of 
pre incident planning in conjunction with its yearly hazard vulnerability assessment 
(HVA). The emergency management committee (EMC) has concerns about facility ability 
to maintain a safe environment of care for its residents with limited electric power as 
this is a type of incident that is not high on its HVA. It is considering two possible 
situations that may develop, shortage of critical supplies and communications failure.  
 To assist in its planning and response to the incident, the EMC has developed an 
overview of the impact of the incident on ECNH. The evaluation is based on the detailed 
inventories of key facility systems, utilities and resources, as well as its plans and 
procedures for resident care, staff support and anticipated community support during 
the incident. What follows is a summary of the evaluation as discussed by the EMC, 
including consideration of OEM and DOH situations reports and baseline bed availability 
data as of August 18, 2012  
 
Critical Supply Shortage – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECNH has food, fluids, medication, linens and personal supplies for about 3 days, and about 3.5 
days (84 hrs) of diesel fuel on site to power its emergency generator. Due to the regional 
distribution of the power outage, it is concerned about local resource depletion especially if the 
outage continues for several days. It is Saturday. The local public utility company and Office of 
Emergency Management have reported that the extent of the outage will not be fully 
appreciated before Monday and are unable to provide a good estimate of the duration at this 
time. Some EMC members recall that a power outage that struck the region 2 years ago lasted 
9 days. The facility will initiate conservation methods today and expects to continue in that 
mode at least through Monday. The EMC anticipates that supply shortages resulting from the 
power outage may limit its ability to obtain delivery of fuel and medical gas supplies as well as 
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service to its generator should that be needed. ECNH anticipates that the impact the supply 
shortage should be resolved between 24 – 96 hours after the resumption of regular electrical 
power services. As the power failure is a community wide incident, ECNH estimates that about 
30% of its staff will be unable or unwilling to show for work as they deal with the power outage 
personally. ECNH’s staff transport plan is limited and is not expected to have a significant 
impact in this circumstance. Schools are closed and some families have relocated out of town to 
stay with friends and family.  However, due to wide distribution of the incident, disruption of 
community based supply chain and large distribution of evacuation zone if needed, full 
restoration of services, staff and depleted resources will take more than 24 hrs.  
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
ECNH has run checks on all critical life safety systems and security systems. All are operating. All 
life safety and most door locking systems are on the EPS. Those that are not will default to the 
open position. These areas will now require 24 hrs/day monitoring which will be further 
impacted by staffing shortages. The facility is drafty, and some areas do receive excessive sun 
exposure which will negatively impact maintenance of internal temperature. The HVAC is on 
emergency generator and should be able to continue per the availability of fuel. However, 
strain on the emergency generator due to prolonged operations at high output and high 
temperatures and strain on AC units is expected to lead to more significant restriction of power 
to at least some essential zones. Two of the five elevators are on emergency power. This will 
greatly slow down but not preclude vertical transit of residents and services. In order to 
conserve fuel, the power to some essential zones (AC, ventilation) would be reduced. Of 
concern is that though the generator has been tested monthly, careful review of recent logs 
indicates that load was less than the recommended 30% of the kW rating and that test times 
had included warm up and cool down. Facility management will monitor the generator and has 
advised that further power reductions in power may be needed if the duration of the power 
outage increases.  ECNH’s internal phone and intercom communications system is operational. 
External land line and cell phone services are very unreliable. It does not have a cache of cell 
phones, so is reliant on staff phones already on site. It does not own a Sat phone and does not 
have any priority (GETS, WPS, TSP) service agreements in place. It has tested its two way radios 
and found that not all are operable. Facility management has placed them on chargers to 
replenish the power source.  It does not have 800 mhz or amateur radio in place. It anticipated 
difficulty contacting external partners for support will worsen over the next few operational 
periods but otherwise impact due to supply shortage is limited.  
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support, External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. ECNH does not have adequate evacuation equipment, and only about 25% of 
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staff have been trained on its use. Combined with a significant staff shortage and limited use of 
elevators, evacuation will be much more difficult, time consuming and physically demanding, 
with total times estimates of at least twice that of planning assumptions.  The EMC has 
reviewed ECNHs evacuation and shelter in place plans with facilities management, dietary, 
nursing and human resources. The facility is secure. It has the resources and a stay team 
available. It can SIP but is not confident of the time frame as there is concern that it will be 
completely reliant on its EPS. In spite of conservation measures, as supply of resources 
decreases during the incident, staff will have to spend more time and effort to distribute its on-
site supplies to its residents as supplies will have to be moved from deeper in reserves for 
actual use. ECNH has learned that many of its mutual aid partners in contiguous counties have 
been impacted by the power failure and share the same concerns about staffing and resources 
should the outage continue for several days. Many have indicated that though suitable beds are 
available, they do not expect to be able to receive resident evacuees should that become 
necessary.  ECNH incident management considers that that if evacuation becomes necessary, 
many residents may need to be placed outside the community, more than one hour travel time 
each way and may face extensive delays due to shortage of transportation resources and staff 
to accompanying them during transport. Some reduction of resident related services (hot food, 
social activities) and environmental services (AC) have already been made to decrease fuel 
consumption. Further decreases in AC due to fuel or system failure due to internal heat may 
lead to completed disruption of this utility. Dialysis treatments may have to be relocated due to 
staffing and supply issues. Further decreases in the type and timing of resident services could 
become intolerable for some residents and few if any reasonable mitigation strategies are 
available.  Many of ECNH’s mutual aid partners, facilities, local vendors and emergency 
management partners will be equally challenged by the power outage and may not be able to 
provide assistance in the form of medical and non-medical supplies.  If the outage becomes 
protracted, and/or its distribution widens over the next operational period, resource 
replenishment from external sources will be more much difficult and time consuming.   
 
Communications Failure – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
The power outage is making it difficult and slow to communicate with external contacts.  Cell 
phone service is poor; land lines are unavailable.  ECNH has resources and supplies on site for 
approximately 72 hours, including diesel fuel on hand for 3.5 days at 100% emergency power.  
There is concern that the drain on existing communications systems in the region will only 
Critical Supply 
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strain and worsen the ability to communicate as the incident continues. The EMC expects this 
to worsen over the next few operational periods further complicating the impact of 
communication. Since it is a Saturday, residential power demand is relatively high while 
business and industry power usage is relatively low. The local public utility company and Office 
of Emergency Management have reported that a full deployment of emergency crews and 
complete assessment of full damage and effects of the outage will not occur before Monday. 
They are unable to provide a good estimate of the duration of the outage at this time. Some 
EMC members recall that a power outage that struck the region 2 years ago lasted 9 days.  
ECNH anticipates that the impact that communications capabilities should be resolved between 
8 - 24 hours after the resumption of regular electrical power services. Once the EOC team is in 
place, ECNH begins to examine its in house staff and ability to contact off duty staff. It 
anticipates that up to 30% of its staff will not be able to come to work during the next 
operational period and it urgently needs to communicate with staff or volunteers to be able to 
maintain safe operations.  
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
ECNH has reviewed all life safety systems. They are operational and connected to the 
emergency power system (EPS). It has adequate internal communications to manage life safety 
systems. However, given the uncertain duration of the event, continued strain on regional 
communications could lead to failure and inability to reach out for any needed supplies or 
services.  ECNH security systems are also operational and connected to the EPS and has 
adequate internal communications capabilities should any security issues arise during the 
power outage. However, even these devices will become drained over time and less available.  
Reduced internal communications could be a threat to security.  Strain on the emergency 
generator due to prolonged operations at high output and high temperatures will lead to need 
to restrict use of this power to only critical care systems and leave communications support to 
dwindle. Therefore there will be reduced internal and external essential communications.  
ECNH has multiple IOC systems, however, given the uncertain duration of the event, continued 
strain on regional communications could lead to failure and inability to reach out for any 
needed resources or services to support continued operation of these critical utilities.  Our 
vendors and contract agencies may not even have communications operating to be reached by.  
Essentially isolating the facility from help and endangering safe operations.    
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support, External Supplies  
The power outage is making it difficult to communicate with staff and local situation reports 
indicate that travel is very difficult. ECNH expects that given its own staffing limitations, limited 
access and experience using evacuation equipment, all response related activities would 
require much more time and effort, is concerned about the physical demand of manual tasks 
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during the heat wave, and that internal and external evacuation time frames will run several 
times longer than those used for its planning assumptions. Though there is no danger to the 
structure of ECNH, and it can sustain all usual operations to SIP for about 3 days without 
external replenishment of supplies. There is however concern that prolonged duration and 
limited ability to communicate with the vendor and support communications will negatively 
impact this ability if the time frame becomes protracted.  ECNH has begun to contact its local 
mutual aid partners. From those with whom it can communicate, it is learning that many other 
health care facilities both in and contiguous to Empire County are also experiencing power and 
in some cases communications outages, compounded by large staff shortages. NYSDOH - 
Health Emergency Response Data System (HERDS) surveys normally used to assess the bed 
availability and appropriate care capabilities for ECNH residents, do not have complete 
information on all facilities due to difficulty in communications. With the information currently 
available it is suggested that only about 50% of ECNH residents can be placed locally and the 
remainder would need to travel at least 90 minutes to be placed.  Internal supplies will dwindle 
during the incident, despite conservation methods. Its internal communications capability is 
intact and should have only limited impact on its on duty staff’s ability to distribute resources 
and supplies per established plans and procedures. The local power company is not able to 
provide an estimated duration, and therefore worsening communications will greatly increase 
the difficulty to communicate needs for assets and supplies, even if they were available within 
the region. This is expected to worsen on Monday when business and industry demands and 
strains on power are added to residential.  Due to the general power failure, access to 
electronic medical records is unavailable and the facility would need to rely on paper patient 
files; the ability to communicate for needed resources, including staff to perform these 
services, especially as duration of event continues, is at risk, and could endanger the facility's 
ability to provide these key services.   ECNH has multiple IOC systems, however, but given the 
uncertain duration of the event, continued strain on regional communications could lead to 
failure and inability to reach out for any needed resources or services to support continued 
critical operations.  Our vendors and contract agencies may not even have communications 
operating to be reached by.  Essentially isolating the facility from help and endangering safe 
operations.    
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Scenario III: Ice Storm – Overview of Incident  
 
It is Thursday January 13, 2012. The emergency management committee (EMC) of Empire 
County Adult Care Facility (ECACF) has been following the National Weather Service (NWS) and 
local OEM/DOH updates about a large low pressure system currently in the Ohio valley. This 
system is predicted to move eastward into the Big Valley area, including Empire County (EC) by 
Sunday January 15, 2012, bringing with it heavy precipitation which will convert to freezing rain 
and sleet. EC and each of its contiguous county neighbors is predicted to experience about ¼ 
“of ice accumulation.  By late Monday January 16, sustained winds are expected to increase to 
between 20 – 25 mph.  By Tuesday January 17, the area of EC and its contiguous neighbors is 
expected to experience several days of cold weather, ranging from 12 – 270 F. OEM and DOH 
are warning facilities that total storm impact on health care organizations will likely be at least 3 
– 4 days after the end of the storm.  
 ECACF has established baseline Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST) scores as part 
of pre incident planning in conjunction with its yearly hazard vulnerability assessment 
(HVA). The emergency management committee (EMC) has concerns about facility ability 
to maintain a safe environment of care for its residents with limited electric power, a 
type of incident that is high on its HVA. It is considering two possible situations that may 
develop, failure of the electrical utility and shortage of critical supplies. 
 To assist in its planning and response to the incident, the EMC has developed an 
overview of the impact of the incident on ECNH. The evaluation is based on the detailed 
inventories of key facility systems, utilities and resources, as well as its plans and 
procedures for resident care, staff support and anticipated community support during 
the incident. What follows is a summary of the evaluation as discussed by the EMC, 
including consideration of OEM and DOH situations reports and baseline bed availability 
data as of January 13, 2012.  
Loss of electrical power utility – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
Loss of electrical utility due to the downing of wind-blown ice laden power lines at the service 
entry to the facility has occurred in the past. ECACF’s EM committee considers the storm as 
predicted is likely to cause power disruptions. Based on its experience, this manageable but 
does represent a significant challenge as the facility must rely solely on emergency power for an 
indeterminate period of time. The facility has adequate supplies of food, fluids, linens and 
personal supplies on- site for resident and staff needs for at least 72 hours, including about 3.5 
days of fuel for its emergency generator which has a burn rate of about 400 gallons per day at 
100%.  It will need to initiate and maintain fuel conservation measures which it expects to 
continue throughout the outage, operating on an initial projected time frame of 8 - 24 hours. 
Based on National Weather Service (NWS) and local reports, the active storm period is 
 National Center for Disaster Preparedness | 215 West 125th Street, Suite 303, New York NY 10027 
 
56 
predicted to last for 12- 18 hours, followed by an additional three to four days of sub-freezing 
temperatures. The EMC considers it unlikely that the facility will receive any external supplies, 
including fuel, for at least four (4) days.  Prolonged use of the emergency generator for four (4) 
or more days will lead to shortage of fuel, attempts at power shedding may result in HVAC 
disruption.  Considering past experience of line repair times of 2-3 days, ECACF anticipates that 
full restoration and recovery will take four (4) to five (5) days, including repatriation of residents 
should evacuation become necessary. Staff shortages are expected due to the storm, local road 
conditions and as staff deal with their own disruptions/loss of electrical power that will be 
common in the region. This will make it more difficult to augment staff to manage on site utility 
and resident needs.  
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
Life safety systems are connected to the emergency power system (EPS), are currently intact 
and functioning. Fluctuations in power associated with fuel conservation methods will 
necessitate facility staff to monitor the LS systems well beyond that required for routine 
maintenance. Reductions or complete shut off of power in some areas of the facility will result 
in decreased internal and external lighting which may limit the use of security surveillance 
systems. This will force security to be more reliant on human monitoring.  
The emergency power system is not configured into emergency and critical equipment zones, 
so power shedding for fuel conservation will not be possible without totally cutting off power to 
other areas and utilities of the facility. ECACF will shut down power to any areas of the facility 
not essential to resident or staff safety. This will result in closure of the exercise rooms, some of 
the elevators, some dining areas, and decrease in the usual internal temperature to the main 
lobby and recreational areas. Not all elevators or pumps or cooking functions are connected to 
emergency power.  To the degree possible, those that are will have power reduced and/or shut 
down to conserve fuel and maintain internal temperature during the cold snap. The generator 
will need constant monitoring. All communications systems are operable. Loss of power and 
weather conditions will likely affect at least cell service. ECACF has limited IOC capabilities and 
lacks any radio equipment.  The primary EOC is in the lobby which is now closed so incident 
command will need to relocate to the secondary EOC, which does not have internet 
connection.  
Plans and Procedures for Resident Care, Staff Support, External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Given the loss of use of 50% of the elevators using the EPS, as well as some 
restrictions in lighting and closure of some areas of the facility, the EMC anticipates that the 
time required for resident packaging and transport to internal staging will require about twice 
the time based on its established planning assumptions. The EMC has reviewed ECACFs 
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evacuation and shelter in place plans with facilities management, dietary, nursing and human 
resources. The facility is secure, has the resources and a stay team available and is operating on 
a minimum SIP time frame of 2-3 days if that becomes necessary. It anticipates that it will need 
to rely on EPS for at least some of this period. Restriction of power to various facility systems 
which will result in decreased lighting to some areas such are basement and ground floor 
storage, loss of half the elevators, various pumps and some cooking functions. This will increase 
the difficulty, time and effort needed to obtain, manage and distribute on site supplies and 
resources throughout the facility. It will also lead to the shut-down of power to any areas of the 
facility not essential to resident or staff safety, such as the lobby, closure of group common 
meeting areas, exercise rooms, dining and some recreational areas. Non-essential resident 
activities, such as admissions, transfers, scheduling, assessments and exercise services will be 
discontinued or limited as much as possible. Changes in routines for behavioral health residents 
and or residents with other special needs or unique vulnerabilities will be very disruptive to this 
population. ECACF participates in a local mutual aid plan with other HCFs (including ACFs) in EC 
and contiguous counties.  Based on the forecasts, most of these facilities will be within the 
storm’s impact zone and are likely to experience similar interruption of municipal power, 
reliance on emergency power systems and shortage of resources. ECACF plans to discharge to 
home about 10% of its residents. Local baseline bed availability data has identified suitable 
beds, but most are outside the community and would require resident transport more than one 
county away, well beyond anticipated planning assumptions, and estimated to require more 
than 90 minutes travel one way. The storm and sub-freezing cold weather are predicted to 
continue for four (4) days. Local OEM reports that road travel is expected to be very hazardous 
for the next several days. Thus, ability to acquire supplies, including fuel, from external sources 
will be limited both during and just following the storm.  
 
 
Critical Supply Shortage – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECACF has had some past experience with severe winter ice storms which resulted in 
interruption access to critical medical and non-medical supplies and other key resources.  
ECACF’s emergency generator has a burn rate of about 400 gallons per day at 100%.  There is 
about 1500 gallons of # 2 diesel fuel on hand (about 3.5 days).  The facility has adequate 
supplies on site for resident and staff needs for 72 hours. Based on the forecasted weather, 
OEM reports on possible road conditions, and past experiences, the EMC anticipates that it will 
not receive any deliveries for at least four (4) days. This will place the facility in a vulnerable 
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position which would force adoption of system wide conservation measures and curtailment of 
facility services to residents. Conservation measures and interruption of the flow of medical 
and non-medical supplies is expected to trigger other problems, such as shortage of fuel for the 
generator, loss of external support (e.g., repairs to generator and damage to physical plant) and 
shortage of tanked oxygen.  Critical resource supply should have only limited direct impact on 
staffing at ECACF.  Staff who do not live nearby and do present to work and need housing will 
increase use of some supplies and further stress conservation methods. If supply shortage 
occurs as anticipated, based on its past experiences it expects that it will take about 24 – 36 
hours to recover, including repatriation of residents if evacuation becomes necessary.  
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
The ECACF’s emergency management committee does not expect critical supply shortage to 
have any direct impact on the facility’s life safety systems (fire, emergency lighting systems and 
alarms) or safety and security systems. The facility has a history of leaks and/or water intrusion 
due to wind driven rain or snow. The windows are double-paned. The exterior doors and large 
glass walls of the dining areas and lobby are subject to moderate drafting and loss of heat. Loss 
or interruption in resources may increase the duration and or cost of repairs to any aspects of 
the physical plant that are damaged during the storm.   
The emergency power system is not divided into emergency and critical equipment zones, so 
power shedding to lessen consumption of fuels will not be possible. The facility is drafty which 
will negatively impact maintenance of internal temperature. The HVAC systems are on 
emergency generator and should be able to continue per the availability of fuel. Strain on the 
emergency generator due to prolonged operations at high output and resultant high 
temperatures is expected to lead to force further restriction of power to at least some essential 
zones. Boilers are gas fired, other utilities, plumbing, water and sanitation should not be 
affected. Loss of critical supplies should not directly impact ECACFs internal or external 
communications capabilities. It will need to ensure that all battery back-ups are brought up to 
full charge.  
Plans and Procedures for Resident Care, Staff Support, External Supplies  
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Most of ECACF's residents are ambulatory. The facility has a small selection 
evacuation support supplies. Loss of critical supplies and system wide conservation methods 
will have only limited impact on the ability to evacuate. EMC has reviewed ECACFs evacuation 
and shelter in place plans with facilities management, dietary, nursing and human resources. 
The facility is secure though drafty. It has the resources and a stay team available and is 
operating on a minimum SIP time frame of 2-3 days if that becomes necessary. Most of ECACF’s 
mutual aid partners will be within the storm’s impact zone and would be expected to 
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experience similar interruption of access and delivery of medical and non-medical supplies. 
Local bed availability data has identified suitable beds, but facilities within 30 – 60 minute travel 
time have already indicated that they will be reluctant to accept evacuees due to similar 
concerns of resource shortages. The EMC anticipates that most potential receiving facilities will 
be well outside the community and would require resident transport of up to 90 minutes one 
way, well beyond its planning assumptions. Predicted storm and cold weather duration will 
necessitate that conservation methods will have to be in place for at least four (4) days. As 
supply of resources decreases during the incident, ECACF staff will have to spend more time 
and effort to distribute its on-site supplies to its residents and to maintain other facility services 
as supplies will have to be moved from deeper in reserves for actual use. To conserve non-
medical supplies, some non-essential resident activities, such as admissions, transfers, 
scheduling, assessment, exercise services, social gatherings, field and shopping trips will be 
curtailed. Changes in routines for behavioral health residents and or residents with other 
special needs or unique vulnerabilities will also be affected. ECACF participates in a local mutual 
aid plan with other HCF in EC and contiguous counties. However, based on the forecasted 
weather, most of these facilities will be within the storm’s impact zone, will experience their 
own supplies shortages and be unable to assist ECACF. Road and travel conditions will also 
further complicate and lengthen trip time to and from more distant sites that may have 
supplies.        
 
                                                                        
Scenario IV: Ice Storm – Overview of Incident 
 
Friday, January 13, 2012:  The emergency management committee of ECACF has been following 
the National Weather Service (NWS) and local OEM/DOH updates of a large low pressure 
system currently in the Ohio valley. This system is predicted to move eastward into the Big 
Valley area, including Empire County (EC) by Sunday January 15, 2012, bringing with it heavy 
precipitation which will convert to freezing rain and sleet. EC, and each of its contiguous county 
neighbors is predicted to receive .3 – 1.00 “of ice accumulation.  By late Monday January 16, 
sustained winds are expected to increase to between 20 – 25 mph, with gusts reaching 35 – 40 
mph.  By Tuesday January 17, the area of EC and its contiguous neighbors is expected to 
experience several days of very cold temperatures, ranging from 0 – 14 0 F, and continued 
moderate cloud cover. OEM and the local power authorities are warning the region that storm 
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related damage to trees will likely block roads and interrupt power supplies. DOH is advising 
health care facilities to plan for a total storm impact that may last 4 - 5 days beyond the storm.   
 ECNH has established baseline Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST) scores as part of 
pre incident planning in conjunction with its yearly hazard vulnerability assessment 
(HVA). The emergency management committee (EMC) has concerns about facility ability 
to maintain a safe environment of care for its residents during the approaching ice 
storm, which is high on its hazard vulnerability assessment. It is considering two possible 
situations that may develop, failure of the electrical utility and shortage of critical 
supplies.  
 To assist in its planning and response to the incident, the EMC has developed an 
overview of the impact of the incident on ECNH. The evaluation is based on the detailed 
inventories of key facility systems, utilities and resources, as well as its plans and 
procedures for resident care, staff support and anticipated community support during 
the incident. What follows is a summary of the evaluation as discussed by the EMC, 
including consideration of OEM and DOH situations reports and baseline bed availability 
data as of January 13, 2012 
Loss of electrical power utility – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
Loss of electrical utility due to the downing of wind-blown ice laden power lines at the service 
entry to the facility has occurred in the past. ECACF’s EM committee considers the storm as 
predicted is likely to cause power disruptions. Based on its experience, this is manageable but 
does represent a significant challenge as the facility must rely solely on emergency power for an 
indeterminate period of time. The facility has adequate supplies of food, fluids, linens and 
personal supplies on- site for resident and staff needs for at least 72 hours, including about 3.5 
days of fuel for its emergency generator which has a burn rate of about 400 gallons per day at 
100%.  It will need to initiate and maintain fuel conservation measures which it expects to 
continue throughout the outage, operating on a projected time frame of 4-5 days beyond the 
storm, as recommended by OEM and DOH reports. Fortunately its boilers are gas fired.   Based 
on National Weather Service (NWS) and local reports, the active storm period is predicted to 
last for 12- 18 hours, followed by an additional three to four days of sub-freezing temperatures. 
The EMC considers it unlikely that the facility will receive any external supplies, including fuel, 
for at least four (4) days.  Prolonged use of the emergency generator for four (4) or more days 
will lead to shortage of fuel, attempts at power shedding may result in HVAC disruption.  
Considering past experience of line repair times of 2-3 days, ECACF anticipates that full 
restoration and recovery will take four (4) to five (5) days, including repatriation of residents 
should evacuation become necessary. Facility loss of electrical utility will have limited impact on 
staff. Staff shortages are expected due to the storm, local road conditions and as staff deal with 
their own disruptions/loss of electrical power that will be common in the region. This will make 
it more difficult to augment staff to manage on site utility and resident needs.  
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Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
Life safety systems are connected to the emergency power system (EPS), are currently intact 
and functioning. Fluctuations in power associated with fuel conservation methods which will be 
in place for the duration of the incident will necessitate facility staff to monitor the LS systems 
well beyond that required for routine maintenance. Reductions and complete shut off of power 
in some areas of the facility for fuel conservation will result in decreased internal and external 
lighting. This may limit the use of security and surveillance systems, also on EPS, forcing security 
to be more reliant on human monitoring, which may be exacerbated by staffing issues.   
ECACF boilers are gas fired and it can produce steam. The boilers will be strained to maintain 
reasonable internal temperature due to the very low temperatures and leaky and drafty 
windows and large rooms. Auxiliary electric heater that would usually be used to supplement 
heat in some areas will not be used to shed load and decrease fuel consumption. In order to 
conserve fuel, some areas of the facility will need to be shut completely, with restrictions of 
staff and resident access.  
The emergency power system is not configured into emergency and critical equipment zones. 
Power shedding for fuel conservation will not be possible without totally cutting off power to 
other areas and utilities of the facility. ECACF will shut down power to any areas of the facility 
not essential to resident or staff safety. This will result in closure of the exercise rooms, some of 
the elevators, some dining areas, and decrease in the usual internal temperature to the main 
lobby and recreational areas. To stretch resources further, residents may be moved staff and 
residents will be confined in restricted and smaller areas of the facility. The generator will need 
constant monitoring. All communications systems are operable. Loss of power and weather 
conditions will likely affect at least cell service. ECACF has limited IOC capabilities and lacks any 
radio equipment.  The primary EOC is in the lobby which is now closed so incident command 
will need to relocate to the secondary EOC, which does not have internet connection.  
Plans and Procedures for Resident Care, Staff Support, External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Reduction of power to elevators and lighting in some areas in order to 
conserve fuel will decrease the safety, and increase the time needed to evacuate. The EMC 
anticipates that the time required for resident packaging and transport to internal staging will 
be about twice that of its established planning assumptions.  EMC has reviewed ECACFs 
evacuation and shelter in place plans with facilities management, dietary, nursing and human 
resources. The facility is secure, but would be reliant on emergency power and would be 
exercising system wide resource conservation methods. Based on NWS and local reports, and 
consistent with DOH and OEM recommendations, ECACF is projecting a 4 – 5 day time frame for 
SIP, without external replenishment of supplies. SIP for this length of time will be more difficult 
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due staffing limitations which are expected to increase over future operational periods.  ECACF 
participates in a local mutual aid plan with other HCFs (including ACFs) in EC and contiguous 
counties. However, based on the forecasts, most of these facilities will be within the storm’s 
impact zone and are likely to experience similar interruption of municipal power, reliance on 
emergency power systems and shortage of resources. ECACF plans to discharge to home about 
10% of its residents. Local bed availability data has identified suitable beds, but most are 
outside the community and would require resident transport more than one county away, well 
beyond anticipated planning assumptions, and estimated to require more than 90 minutes 
travel one way.  To reduce load and conserve fuel, all non-essential resident activities, such as 
admissions, transfers, scheduling, assessments and exercise services will be discontinued until 
full recovery is achieved. Changes in routines for behavioral health residents and or residents 
with other special needs or unique vulnerabilities will be necessary to manage these residents 
with fewer staff and or in unusual locations and groups within the facility. This too will be 
maintained until full recovery has been achieved. The storm and following cold weather snap 
are predicted to continue for about five days. Local OEM reports that road travel is expected to 
be very hazardous for the next several days. Combined, ECACFs ability to acquire supplies, 
including fuel, from external sources will be severely limited for at least 5 days.  
 
Critical Supply Shortage - Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision 
ECACF has had only limited experience with severe winter ice storms and resultant loss of 
community support in the past. It has adequate on site supply of resources for 72 hrs, including 
about 3.5 days of fuel (at 100% load) for its emergency generator. The ice storm and follow on 
cold weather is predicted to impact the entire region for least four days, ensuring that ECACF 
will be without external support beyond the limit of it’s on-site cache without resource 
conservation measures. Based on NWS and local reports, the active storm period is predicted to 
last for 12- 18 hours. Forecasts for ice accumulation and continued sub-freezing temperatures 
will make it likely that ECACF will not receive any external supplies for at least four (4) days and 
will force adoption of conservation measures to deal with dwindling supplies. The EMC 
anticipates that storm related interruption to the flow of medical and non-medical supplies will 
likely trigger several other situations, (vulnerabilities) including shortage of fuel for the 
generator,  loss of external support (e.g., repairs to generator and damage to physical plant) 
and shortage of tanked oxygen. If ECACF has to evacuate due to resource shortages 
compounded by loss of external support, it anticipates the ability to recover from these 
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situations, including repatriation of residents within 24 - 36 hours following full restoration of 
all services. Full recovery and repatriation cannot be estimated based on the current 
information.  ECACF has electronic and hard copy staff contact lists. On site staff will be 
retained and provided key support services, including limited family lodging, as applicable. 
ECACF has a plan to transport staff to and from the facility when traditional staff transportation 
means are unavailable and to provide staff lodging, supplies and food during a SIP event. 
Though it expects to encounter transport related difficulties, it is expected that less than 10% of 
staff may not be able to reach the facility due to local road conditions and/or will be unavailable 
as they are managing their own family and home safety and security.  
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
Critical supply shortage is not expected to have any significant impact any life safety, such as 
fire, emergency lighting systems and alarms or security systems. These systems are connected 
to the emergency power and are operable. Safety and security includes internal and external 
rounds by trained staff. ECACF houses behavioral and dementia residents who require regular 
monitoring. The facility has a history of leaks and/or water intrusion due to wind driven rain or 
snow. The windows are double paned. The exterior doors and large glass walls of the dining 
areas and lobby are subject to moderate drafting and loss of heat. Loss or interruption in 
resources may increase the duration and or cost of repairs to any aspects of the physical plant 
that are damaged during the storm.  With the exception of risk of losing systems that rely on 
battery back-up, loss of critical supplies should not impact ECACFs internal or external 
communications capabilities. It will need to ensure that all battery back-ups are brought up to 
full charge. The emergency power system is not divided into emergency and critical equipment 
zones, so power shedding to lessen consumption of oil fuels will not be possible. Loss of 
municipal power locally is possible but duration cannot be predicted. Not all elevators or pumps 
or cooking functions are connected to emergency power. Depending on severity and duration, 
most or all of these systems will have power reduced and the emergency generator will need 
constant monitoring.  
Plans and Procedures for Resident Care, Staff Support, External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Most of ECACF's residents are ambulatory. The facility has 3 days of medical 
and non-medical supplies on site, including some evacuation support supplies. Loss of critical 
supplies will have only limited impact on the ability to evacuate.  Based on NWS and local 
reports, and consistent with DOH and OEM recommendations, ECACF is projecting a 4 – 5 day 
time frame for SIP, without external replenishment of supplies. It plans to initiate system wide 
resource conservation immediately and maintain them throughout this period. SIP for this 
length of time will be further restricted by staffing limitations.  ECACF participates in the local 
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mutual aid plan. There are other ACFs in EC and contiguous counties, most of which are within 
the storms impact zone and report that they are experiencing similar problems with critical 
supply shortages. ECACF plans to discharge to home about 10% of its residents. Local bed 
availability data has identified suitable beds but most are outside the community and will 
require resident transport more than one county away, beyond anticipated planning 
assumptions, and estimated to require more than 90 minutes travel one way. ECACF has 
requested pre storm assets from its vendors, including fuel, without success. As supply of 
resources decreases during the incident, ECACF staff will have to spend more time and effort to 
distribute its on-site supplies to its residents and to maintain other facility services as supplies 
will have to be moved from deeper in reserves for actual use. To conserve non-medical 
supplies, some non-essential resident activities, such as admissions, transfers, scheduling, 
assessment, exercise services, social gatherings, field and shopping trips will be curtailed. 
Changes in routines for behavioral health residents and or residents with other special needs or 
unique vulnerabilities will also be affected.  ECACF participates in a local mutual aid plan with 
other HCF in EC and contiguous counties. However, based on the forecasted weather, most of 
these facilities will be within the storm’s impact zone, will experience their own supplies 
shortages and be unable to assist ECACF. Road and travel conditions will also further complicate 
and lengthen trip time to and from more distant sites that may are potential external suppliers 
of resources.   
 
 
Scenario V: Hurricane – Overview of Incident   
 
Thursday, June 21: 1000 am. The emergency management committee (EMC) of Empire County 
Hospital (ECH) has been following the National Weather Service (NWS) updates on tropical 
storm (TS) X beginning with its naming as the first hurricane of the season on Monday June 18, 
with maximum sustained winds of 85 mph (140 km/hr). The storm track included landfall near 
Panama City, Florida with winds of 75 mph (120 km/h), and subsequent weakening to a tropical 
storm then a tropical depression by Wednesday June 20. Present time weather briefing reports 
indicate that the tropical depression unexpectedly re-strengthened into a TS and has once again 
emerged into the Atlantic Ocean near Nags Head, North Carolina. TS “X” is now predicted to 
make landfall near NYC with sustained winds of 65 mph/100km/h on June 22.  Coastal storm 
surge of less than 4 feet (SLOSH 1) is predicted. In the Big Valley region (75 miles north-west of 
NYC), 6 – 10 inches of rain is predicted. A weak low just on the coast is expected to block the 
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storms easterly flow, slowing the storm and contributing to rainfall totals with may reach 18 
inches in some areas. Zero hour (time when winds reach >39 mph) for the Big Valley area is 
predicted to be between 3 – 7 pm, Friday June 22. Local emergency management and health 
department briefing have emphasized that travel after zero hour may not be safe and will be 
restricted.  There are no mandatory evacuation orders at this time. The A river, and its 
tributaries B and C rivers converge in the southern area of Big Valley. They are predicted to 
flood well above previous 100 year (base elevation) flood levels, due in part to new rainfall and 
the 2-3 inches of rain that has fallen in the valley over the past two weeks.  
 
 ECNH has established baseline Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST) scores as part of 
pre incident planning in conjunction with its yearly hazard vulnerability assessment 
(HVA). The emergency management committee (EMC) has concerns about ECH’s ability 
to maintain a safe environment of care for its patients during the storm. This situation is 
high on its hazard vulnerability assessment. It is considering two possible situations that 
may develop, external flooding and internal flooding.  
 To assist in its planning and response to the incident, the EMC has developed an 
overview of the storms possible impact on ECH. The evaluation is based on the detailed 
inventories of key systems, utilities and resources, and plans and procedures for patient 
care, staff support and anticipated community support during the incident. What 
follows is a summary of the evaluation as discussed by the EMC, including consideration 
of OEM and DOH situations reports and baseline bed availability data as of June 21, 
2012 
External Flood – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECH is located at the far edge of the 100 year inundation zone of A river. Predicted rainfall will 
be greater than any in recent memory and rivers in the Big Valley are expected to crest above 
flood levels. ECH is 650 feet from and 15-20 feet above the usual water level. EC Office of 
Emergency Management has informed ECH Emergency Management that based on flood 
mapping, ECH should expect River A flood waters will extend as least 500- 600 feet beyond the 
river banks. The EMC is very concerned about this expectation. Heavy rains over already water 
soaked grounds will increase the impact of external flooding and the likelihood of water 
intrusion at any vulnerable access points and problem drainage areas. The emergency 
generator system is located outside at grade, is protected from wind but not from water 
intrusion. ECH has some sand bags to use for a barrier around the generator and other 
vulnerable access points, will have to fill and construct as barriers, but does not have any 
experience as to the viability of this as a barrier against water intrusion. The expected storm 
period is 18 – 24 hours, beginning at 3 pm Friday. Rivers are predicted to crest on Sunday and 
recede to below flood levels by Tuesday.  External flooding from the river may directly cause 
failure of the outdoor – at grade emergency generator, and result in internal flooding and 
damage to the physical plant and utilities.  Predicted flooding and damage to roads will lead to 
extensive and prolonged disruption of community infrastructure.  ECH anticipates the ability to 
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recover from the external flooding to be within 4-5 days after the storm's end. ECH has 
electronic and hard copy staff contact lists. On site staff will be retained and provided key 
support services, including family lodging, as applicable.  ECH has a plan to transport staff 
during an emergency, but does not expect this to be effective if predictions are on target. It is 
expected that up to 30% of staff may not be able to reach the facility due to local road 
conditions and/or will be unavailable as they are managing their own family and home safety 
and security. This includes some who staff the ICU, CCU, NICU and psychiatric units.   
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
Fire and emergency lighting systems are currently un-affected and are connected to the 
emergency power system. External flooding may interrupt or result in loss of emergency power. 
Internal flooding to key utilities and the electrical rooms located below and at grade will impact 
the LS systems which can operate on battery backup for only limited periods of time. Security 
consists of internal and external rounds and closed circuit camera surveillance. Security and 
surveillance equipment are on emergency power and will function as long as the EPS is intact. 
Internal flooding may disable security systems. Increased security may be needed if areas in the 
building are off limits due to flooding.  ECH has a history of water intrusion during heavy wind 
driven rain and intrusion at several vulnerable access points, problem drainage areas, and door 
frame gaps is expected.  The atrium window is a weak point. Key utilities are located at and or 
below grade but not protected by concrete walls, waterproof doors or pumps. Most windows 
are rated for 60 mph winds, gusts may be higher, glass doors windows are otherwise 
unprotected from flying debris.  ECH has adequate resources and supplies of food, fluids, linens, 
medications and personal supplies for 72 hours. The generator runs off a 4,000 gallon diesel 
fuel tank which is currently full. The emergency power system is not divided into separate 
critical and non-essential zones. Only 3 of its 6 elevators, some pumps and cooking functions 
are connected to emergency power. If regular power fails, most or all non-essential circuits will 
have power reduced and the emergency generator will need constant monitoring and 
protection from external flooding.  The facility does not have external docking or a suitable 
above grade level location to accept another external generator. ECH has tested all its 
communications systems and found them operable. Possible loss of power and weather 
conditions will likely effect at least cell service. ECH does not have a Telecommunications 
Service Priority contract on key lines.  
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support and External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Only half of the facility's 6 elevators are tied to the emergency power system. If 
elevators are used while on emergency power, transport time from the floors to staging areas 
will also be greatly increased. If the EPS fails, evacuation of all patients would have to be 
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conducted manually. ECH has sufficient evacuation equipment but not all staff has been trained 
in its use.  Bed availability surveys have identified suitable beds for most of ECH's patients, most 
are more than one hour of travel away. EMC estimates that total evacuation times may exceed 
twice its planning assumptions. The EMC members have consulted with facilities management, 
nursing and dietary. They have concluded that despite the extreme conditions of the forecasted 
storm, the facility is secure, a stay team can be available and on hand supplies are sufficient to 
SIP. However, patients may need to be moved from rooms to alternate safe refuge zones, and it 
will need to initiate resource conservation and protection measures to basement and ground 
floor supplies immediately. It has no live experience with such procedures. Flooding to first 
floor electrical rooms may further impact loss of power. Water damage to linens on this level 
will make them unusable. ECH does not have an adequate supply of sand bags or inflatable 
bladders to adequately protect all these areas from water intrusion. It would need to obtain 
increased supplies before zero hour to accomplish this task.  
ECH participates in a local mutual aid plan with other hospitals and nursing homes in EC and 
contiguous counties. Several are also in known hazard zones, some are not. External flooding, 
electrical utility power failure, road closures and staffing limitations may impact them similarly 
to ECH. Bed availability surveys have identified suitable beds for most of ECH's patients. Most 
are located outside the community, beyond planning assumption time frames and will require 
more than one hour of travel time one way, longer if road conditions vary. ECH has established 
facility policies and procedures to distribute supplies to all departments as needed. There is 
concern that flooding and water intrusion may damage some resources and/or increase the 
amount of handling and effort needed to distribute supplies, which will cause moderate 
disturbance in services to patients and staff.  ECH anticipates that at some essential patient 
clinical services will be discontinued due to staffing gaps related to 30% of staff shortage. This 
includes some staff who man ICU, CCU, NICU and psychiatric units.  
Flooding external to the facility will block access to the ED and main floor lobby, which will 
interfere with triage, admission and transfers.  Non-essential tests, procedures, ambulatory 
testing and various therapy centers will be closed before zero hour and not resume service until 
travel conditions are safe. Visitor hours will follow the same schedule for all but critical cases. 
Many of ECH’s mutual aid partners in close proximity expect to be equally impacted by storm 
related flooding and limited supply of critical medical and non-medical supplies. Most all will be 
hampered by storm related damage to roads and travel conditions and will not able to assist 
with supplies or resources. Local OEM has advised ECH not to expect external support for at 
least two after the storm's end.  




Internal Flood – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECH is located at the far edge of the 100 year inundation zone of A river. Rainfall and flooding 
from TS X is predicted to be greater than any in recent memory with rivers cresting above flood 
levels. ECH is 650 feet from and 15-20 feet above the usual water level. EC Office of Emergency 
Management has informed ECH that flood mapping suggests that River A flood waters will 
extend at least 500 – 600 feet beyond the river banks. Heavy rains over already water soaked 
grounds (swollen water table) will increase the likelihood of water intrusion (internal flooding) 
at any vulnerable access points and problem drainage areas, and may damage critical utilities 
and stores located on below and at grade including the main lobby and ED.  ECH pre storm 
planning includes sand bagging and placing fillable bladders around these key areas to mitigate 
water intrusion ECH does not have an adequate supply of sand bags or inflatable bladders to 
adequately protect all these areas from water intrusion, will have to fill and construct these 
barriers, but does not have any experience as to the viability of this as a barrier against water 
intrusion. It would need to obtain increased supplies before zero hour to accomplish this task.  
The expected storm period is 18 – 24 hours, beginning at 3 pm Friday. Rivers are expected to 
crest on Sunday and recede to below flood levels by Tuesday. Water table levels should return 
to lower levels following the recession of flood waters. Internal facility flooding from the storm 
may result in damage to the physical plant, and damage or failure of HVAC and boilers.  ECH has 
electronic and hard copy staff contact lists. On site staff will be retained and provided key 
support services, including family lodging, as applicable. Staffing may be limited due to external 
flooding and associated road closures. Internal flooding itself may cause burdens and or limit 
exist staff’s abilities to manage patient care services but will not reduce staff census at work. 
ECH anticipates the ability to recover from the immediate effects of internal flooding within 1 – 
2 days of the storms end. Some areas of the facility may not be available for full use, but the 
overall mission of the facility can be accomplished.  
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
Fire and emergency lighting systems are currently unaffected and are connected to the 
emergency power system. Concern is related to possible water intrusion damage to these 
utilities. Security consists of internal and external rounds and closed circuit camera surveillance. 
Internal surveillance will be limited to the few cameras at key access points. Internal rounds will 
continue but may be limited by the # trained staff available. There are no locked wards. 
Increased security may be needed if areas of the facility remain off limits due to storm related 
damage and water intrusion. ECH has a history of water intrusion during heavy wind driven 
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rainfall, and intrusion at several vulnerable access points, including a large atrium window, 
problem drainage areas, and door frame gaps is expected. Most windows are rated for 60 mph 
winds, gusts may be higher and glass doors windows are otherwise unprotected from flying 
debris. All of this will cause or at least contribute to internal flooding. Key utilities and services, 
e.g., kitchen, refrigeration, cafeteria the ATS, mechanical rooms, boilers are at or below grade, 
are not protected by concrete block walls or sump pumps and are thus vulnerable to internal 
flooding. Pre storm planning includes relocating the cafeteria, and preparing some foods in 
advance. This has been practiced but not tested by a live event. ECH has tested all its 
communications systems and found them operable. Possible loss of power and weather 
conditions will likely effect at least cell service. ECH does not have a Telecommunications 
Service Priority contract on key lines.  
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support, External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Internal flooding may cause damage to the physical plant and immediate 
surroundings of the building that may force changes in internal evacuation routes and or access 
to and from staging areas.  This would make the evacuation process more physically demanding 
and estimated to require about twice the time as in planning assumptions. The EMC members 
have consulted with facilities management, nursing and dietary. They have concluded that 
despite the extreme conditions of the forecasted storm, the facility is secure, a stay team can 
be available and on hand supplies are sufficient to SIP. However, patients may need to be 
moved from rooms to alternate safe refuge zones, and it will need to initiate resource 
conservation and protection measures to basement and ground floor supplies immediately. It 
has no live experience with such procedures. Facilities in neighboring counties impacted by the 
storm may face some of the same internal flooding problems as ECH. This will limit their ability 
to accept ECH patients even if they have suitable available beds and sufficient supply of other 
key resources. The EMC estimates that most patients will need to be placed in available beds 
over one hour travel time, outside its evacuation planning assumptions. ECH has established 
policies and procedures to conserve fuel, food and other resources, and to distribute on site 
supplies to all departments as needed. It has no experience with these procedures during a live 
event. There is concern that flooding and water intrusion may damage some resources and/or 
increase the amount of handling and effort needed to distribute supplies, which will cause 
moderate disturbance in services to patients and staff. ECH anticipates that will be able to 
maintain most all essential patient clinical services. Some basement and first floor services may 
need to be relocated, some areas of the facility may need to be closed due to wet or outright 
flooded floors. This will cause delays and re-routing in the emergency department, processing 
patient admissions and discharges, some radiology functions and some food services.  Most of 
ECH’s nearby mutual aid partners will be in the storm related hazard zone, a few will not. ECH 
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has communicated with many of these facilities, who express concern with their own ability to 
protect their critical infrastructure, supplies and resources during the storm, as they too may 
experience damage from internal flooding. They report that they may not be able to provide 
support if they sustain damages.  
 
 
Scenario VI: Hurricane – Overview of Incident  
  
Thursday, June 21: 1000 am. The emergency management committee (EMC) of Empire County 
Hospital (ECH) has been following the National Weather Service (NWS) updates on TS X 
beginning with its naming as the first hurricane of the season on Monday June 18, with 
maximum sustained winds of 85 mph (140 km/hr). The storm track included landfall near 
Panama City, Florida with winds of 75 mph (120 km/h), and subsequent weakening to a tropical 
storm then a tropical depression by Wednesday June 20. Present time weather briefing reports 
indicate that the tropical depression unexpectedly re-strengthened into a tropical storm (TS) 
and has once again emerged into the Atlantic Ocean near Nags Head, North Carolina. TS “X” is 
now predicted to make landfall near NYC with sustained winds of 65 mph/100km/h on June 
22.  Coastal storm surge of less than 4 feet (SLOSH 1) is predicted. In the Big Valley region (75 
miles north-west of NYC), 6 – 10 inches of rain is predicted. A weak low sitting off the east coast 
may slow the storm’s exit, increase rainfall totals and cause flooding well above previous 100 
year base elevations. Zero hour (time when winds reach > 39mph) for the Big Valley area is 
predicted to be between 3 – 7 pm, Friday June 22. Local emergency management and health 
department briefing have emphasized that travel after zero hour may not be safe and will be 
restricted.  There are no mandatory evacuation orders at this time. The A river, and its 
tributaries converge in the southern area of Big Valley.  
 
 ECNH has established baseline Evacuation Decision Support Tool (EDST) scores as part of 
pre incident planning in conjunction with its yearly hazard vulnerability assessment 
(HVA). The emergency management committee (EMC) has concerns about ECH’s ability 
to maintain a safe environment of care for its patients during the storm. This situation is 
high on its hazard vulnerability assessment. It is considering two possible situations that 
may develop, external flooding and internal flooding.  
 To assist in its planning and response to the incident, the EMC has developed an 
overview of the storms possible impact on ECH. The evaluation is based on the detailed 
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inventories of key systems, utilities and resources, and plans and procedures for patient 
care, staff support and anticipated community support during the incident. What 
follows is a summary of the evaluation as discussed by the EMC, including consideration 
of OEM and DOH situations reports and baseline bed availability data as of June 21, 
2012 
External Flood – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECH is located at the far edge of the 100 year inundation zone of A river. Rainfall and flooding 
from TS X is predicted to be greater than any in recent memory with rivers cresting above flood 
levels. ECH is 650 feet from and 15-20 feet above the usual water level. EC Office of Emergency 
Management has informed ECH that flood mapping suggests that River A flood waters will 
extend at least 400 – 500 feet beyond the river banks. Heavy rains over already water soaked 
grounds may increase the impact of external flooding and the likelihood of water intrusion at 
any vulnerable access points and problem drainage areas. The emergency generator system is 
located outside at grade, protected from wind but not water intrusion. ECH pre storm planning 
includes use of on-site sand bags and fillable bladders as a barrier around the generator should 
flood waters rise to this area. This has been practiced but not tested by a live event. The 
expected storm period is 18 – 24 hours, beginning at 3 pm Friday. Rivers are expected to crest 
on Sunday and recede to below flood levels by Tuesday.  The EMC is operating on a projected 
time frame of at least four days. The storm may cause other problems to develop including loss 
of the emergency generator, internal flooding and loss of internal utilities. ECH has electronic 
and hard copy staff contact lists. On site staff will be retained and provided key support 
services, including limited family lodging, as applicable. Human resources department expects 
that up to 20% of staff may not be able to reach the facility due to local road conditions and/or 
will be unavailable as they are managing their own family and home safety and security. Storm 
related rainfall and winds will cause damage and disruption of community infrastructure and 
usual supply chains. ECH anticipates the ability to recover from the external flooding to be 
within 3-4 days after the storm's end. 
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
ECH life safety systems are currently unaffected. All are connected to the emergency power 
system (EPS). Concern is related to possible water intrusion damage to these utilities. Staff 
monitoring of life safety systems will be increased during the storm. Security consists of internal 
and external rounds and closed circuit camera surveillance. External rounds will be 
discontinued as the storm nears and during the actual storm period and will resume when 
conditions permit. Increased security may be needed if areas around the building are off limits 
due to storm related damage or other hazardous conditions. ECH has a history of water 
intrusion during heavy wind driven rainfall and some intrusion at several vulnerable access 
points, problem drainage areas, and door frame gaps is expected. The atrium window is a weak 
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point. Key utilities are located at and or below grade and are not protected by concrete walls, 
waterproof doors or pumps. Most windows are rated for 60 mph winds, gusts may be higher 
and glass doors windows are otherwise unprotected from flying debris.  . ECH has adequate 
resources and supplies of food, fluids, linens, medications and personal supplies for 72 hours. 
The generator runs off a 4,000 gallon diesel fuel tank which is currently full. The emergency 
power system is not divided into separate critical and non-essential zones. Only 3 of its 6 
elevators, some pumps and cooking functions are connected to emergency power. If regular 
power fails, most or all non-essential circuits will have power reduced and the emergency 
generator will need constant monitoring and protection from external flooding.  The facility 
does not have external docking or a suitable above grade level location to accept another 
external generator. ECH has tested all its communications systems and found them operable. 
Possible loss of power and weather conditions will likely effect at least cell service. ECH does 
not have a Telecommunications Service Priority contract on key lines.  
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support, External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Only 3 of its 6 elevators are tied to the emergency power system. It has some 
evacuation equipment but not all its staff have received training in its use. If evacuation is 
conducted while on emergency power, patient transport from the floors to staging areas will 
require more effort and as estimated by the EMC, about twice the time as in planning 
assumptions. ECH’s nearby mutual aid partners are likely to be similarly impacted by TS X. 
Those more distant are predicted to experience a relatively mild storm with less severe external 
flooding, electrical utility power failure, road closures and resultant staffing limitations.  Bed 
availability surveys have identified suitable beds for most of ECH's patients well within its 
planning assumption of 30 – 60 minutes travel time.  The EMC members have consulted with 
facilities management, nursing and dietary. They have concluded that the facility is secure, a 
stay team can be available and on hand supplies are sufficient to SIP. However, patients may 
need to be moved from rooms to alternate safe refuge zones, and it will need to initiate 
resource conservation and protection measures to basement and ground floor supplies 
immediately. It has no live experience with such procedures. It has established facility policies 
and procedures to distribute supplies to all departments as needed. There is concern that 
flooding and water intrusion may damage some resources and/or increase the amount of 
handling and effort needed to distribute supplies, which will cause moderate disturbance in 
non-essential services to patients and staff.  ECH anticipates that up to 20% of staff, including 
who man ICU, CCU, NICU and psychiatric units will not be present to work. This will disrupt and 
at least delay some patient services. Flooding external to the facility will block access to the ED 
and main floor lobby, which will interfere with triage, admission and transfers.  Non-essential 
tests, procedures, ambulatory testing and various therapy centers will be closed before zero 
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hour and not resume service until travel conditions are safe. Visitor hours will follow the same 
schedule for all but critical cases. The EMC has concerns about limited external supply of 
resources due to storm conditions throughout the region. It has requested some pre storm 
assets, including fuel, from its vendors, and more distant mutual aid partners without success. 
They and local OEM have advised ECH that they cannot release supplies at this time and to 
expect this to continue for at least a 1-2 days after the storm's end. 
 
Internal Flood – Situation Requiring a SIP/Evacuation Decision  
ECH is located at the far edge of the 100 year inundation zone of A river. Rainfall and flooding 
from TS X is predicted to be greater than any in recent memory with rivers cresting above flood 
levels. ECH is 650 feet from and 15-20 feet above the usual water level. EC Office of Emergency 
Management has informed ECH that flood mapping suggests that River A flood waters will 
extend at least 400 – 500 feet beyond the river banks. Heavy rains over already water soaked 
grounds may increase the impact of overall flooding and the likelihood of water intrusion 
(internal flooding) at any vulnerable access points and problem drainage areas, and may 
damage critical utilities and stores which are at or below grade but are not protected by 
concrete block walls or sump pumps. This includes the main lobby and ED. ECH pre storm 
planning includes sand bagging and placing fillable bladders around these key areas to mitigate 
water intrusion. This has been practiced but not tested by a live event. The expected storm 
period is 18 – 24 hours, beginning at 3 pm Friday. Rivers are expected to crest on Sunday and 
recede to below flood levels by Tuesday. Water table levels should return to lower levels 
following the recession of flood waters. Internal facility flooding from the storm may result in 
damage to the physical plant, and damage or failure of HVAC and boilers. ECH has electronic 
and hard copy staff contact lists. On site staff will be retained and provided key support 
services, including family lodging, as applicable. Staffing may be limited due to external flooding 
and associated road closures. Internal flooding itself may cause burdens and or limit exist staff’s 
abilities to manage patient care services but will not reduce staff census at work. ECH 
anticipates the ability to recover from the immediate effects of internal flooding within 1 – 2 
days of the storms end. Some areas of the facility may not be available for full use, but the 
overall mission of the facility can be accomplished.  
Key Facility Systems, Utilities and Resources  
Fire and emergency lighting systems are currently un affected and are connected to the 
emergency power system. Concern is related to possible water intrusion damage to these 
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utilities.  Security consists of internal and external rounds and closed circuit camera 
surveillance. Internal surveillance will be limited to the few cameras at key access points. 
Internal rounds will continue but may be limited by the # trained staff available. There are no 
locked wards. Increased security may be needed if areas of the facility remain off limits due to 
storm related damage and water intrusion.  ECH has a history of water intrusion during heavy 
wind driven rainfall, and intrusion at several vulnerable access points, including a large atrium 
window, problem drainage areas, and door frame gaps is expected. Most windows are rated for 
60 mph winds, gusts may be higher and glass doors windows are otherwise unprotected from 
flying debris. All of this will cause or at least contribute to internal flooding. Key utilities and 
services, e.g., kitchen, refrigeration, cafeteria the ATS, mechanical rooms, boilers are at or 
below grade, are not protected by concrete block walls or sump pumps and are thus vulnerable 
to internal flooding. Pre storm planning includes relocating the cafeteria, and preparing some 
foods in advance. This has been practiced but not tested by a live event. ECH has tested all its 
communications systems and found them operable. Possible loss of power and weather 
conditions will likely effect at least cell service. ECH does not have a Telecommunications 
Service Priority contract on key lines.  
Plans and Procedures for Patient Care, Staff Support, External Supplies 
The EMC is weighing out the pros and cons of evacuation, availability of receiving facilities and 
shelter in place. Internal flooding may cause damage to the physical plant and immediate 
surroundings of the building that may force changes in internal evacuation routes and or access 
to and from staging areas.  This would make the evacuation process more physically demanding 
and it is estimated requiring about twice the time as in planning assumptions. Key utilities and 
services are at or below grade and unprotected. If impacted by internal flooding, ECH’s ability 
to SIP will be compromised, even with sufficient supply of other key resources. Facilities in 
neighboring counties impacted by the storm may face some of the same internal flooding 
problems as ECH. This will limit their ability to accept ECH patients even if they have suitable 
available beds and sufficient supply of other key resources. The EMC estimates that most 
patients can be placed in available beds within its planning assumptions of about 30-60 minutes 
travel time. ECH has established policies and procedures to conserve fuel, food and other 
resources, and to distribute on site supplies to all departments as needed. It has no experience 
with these procedures during a live event. There is concern that flooding and water intrusion 
may damage some resources and/or increase the amount of handling and effort needed to 
distribute supplies, which will cause moderate disturbance in non-essential services to patients 
and staff. ECH anticipates that will be able to maintain most all essential patient clinical 
services. Some basement and first floor services may need to be relocated, some areas of the 
facility may need to be closed due to wet or outright flooded floors. This will cause delays and 
re-routing in the emergency department, processing patient admissions and discharges, some 
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radiology functions and some food services.  Patients may need to be moved to other 
location/rooms in the facility that are not located on outside walls or have unprotected glass 
windows. ECH participates in a local mutual aid plan with other hospitals and nursing homes in 
EC and contiguous counties. Most of these facilities will be in the storm related hazard zone, a 
few will not. ECH has communicated with many of these facilities, who express concern with 
their own ability to protect their critical infrastructure, supplies and resources during the storm, 
as they too may experience damage from internal flooding. They report that they may not be 
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